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Preface  
Alexis Crow (Chatham House), Pernille Rieker (NUPI) and Ole Jacob 
Sending (NUPI) 
 
This report is NUPIs contribution to the Chatham house portfolio of 
projects entitled Cultural Dialogue in International Security. The col-
laboration between NUPI and Chatham House commenced in Decem-
ber 2011 with a discussion of the need for a cross-cultural dialogue 
between actors seeking to manage risks to their security. Since our 
initial meeting, the scope of the project has widened beyond the realm 
of security and defence, as the fundamental concepts of the project 
resonate more broadly within the changing contours of foreign policy, 
and have been developed alongside ‘Dialogue’ project of Jonas Gahr 
Støre and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. 
 
Two events have occurred which have pushed the project – and the 
cooperation between NUPI, the MFA and Chatham House – outside 
of the remit of international security: the deepening of the financial 
crisis sparked by the crash of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
and the Arab Spring. Firstly, the global fiscal crisis accelerated a pow-
er shift in international relations from West to East, changing the 
terms of engagement for many Western countries that previously en-
joyed the luxury of ‘calling the shots’ with rising powers and new 
stakeholders. Now, with the fate of the Euro hanging in the balance, 
and trillions of dollars of toxic assets left unaddressed on both sides of 
the Atlantic, Western countries need to cooperate with others not only 
to ensure security at home, but also need actively diversify investment 
with partners outside of their geographical borders in order to ensure 
their own economic vitality and sustainability.  
 
Secondly, the tumult across the Arab world – culminating in the Arab 
‘Spring’ or ‘Awakening’ – meant that the terms of this engagement 
had to change: the US and other Western democracies could no longer 
pick and choose the constituencies with whom they engaged in the oil 
rich region of the Middle East.  Paradoxically, as the victories of En-
nahada and the Muslim Brotherhood have demonstrated, greater de-
mocracy might actually mean greater conservatism: in other words, 
Western translations of democracy and governance were neither abso-
lute nor universally desirable.   
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So, the enduring financial crisis of 2008 meant that dialogue on the 
world stage was not only important but also necessary, for both securi-
ty and for economic growth, and the change of regimes across the Ar-
ab world meant that the rules of engagement could no longer be set by 
the West.  In light of these objective realities, as we have convened 
roundtable events throughout the course of the Cultural Dialogue pro-
ject, participants have largely been agreement that in order for mean-
ingful dialogue to take place, actors need to adopt a ‘holistic’ ap-
proach: that is, policymakers must speak with all people, across all 
sectors.  As the Arab revolt made patently clear, a problem-solving 
approach involves talking to many different constituencies – from the 
‘Twitter generation’ to a regime that may hold power illegitimately. 
As Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store rightly points out, ‘We [Nor-
wegians] speak to everybody’.  
 
Cross-cultural dialogue in international relations is also best conduct-
ed across sectors, rather than through ‘stove-piped’ spheres of infor-
mation. Although elements of this approach are currently practiced by 
some groups – such as Western militaries engaged in counter-
insurgency, NGOs in conflict zones, and by certain businesses en-
gaged in international investment – we see the value in delivering this 
framework for dialogue as a coherent approach to policymakers – one 
which can be adopted not just by Western governments, but by new 
stakeholders seeking to bridge gaps in understanding across flash-
points such as the Middle East, the horn of Africa, south Asia, and 
East Asia.  
 
It must be noted that this approach is not a panacea for conflict: there 
will be times in which dialogue falls victim to certain ‘demands of 
human dignity’ which one party deems to be ‘non-negotiable’: in the 
practice of international relations, these ‘red lines’ often appear in a 
divergence of perception of gender or tolerance or contrasting under-
standings of corruption. However, by adopting this framework for dia-
logue, we hope that policymakers can hope to secure interests, express 
values, and manage risks in a globalized era. 
 
In our experience, Norway and Qatar are currently two states which 
put these ideas in practice – our anticipation is that the value of this 
approach takes root with governments and with businesses in an in-
creasingly complex world. Although humans share similar concerns, 
they define these needs in accordance with different preferences: by 
engaging in dialogue, one hopes that each party may meet with a view 
that they will not only have their own needs met, but that they might 
one day learn from one another. 
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Inter-cultural dialogue in crises – a 
comparative study 
Pernille Rieker and Ole Jacob Sending (NUPI) 
Introduction 
Diplomacy is all about mediating between political units. To a great 
extent, it is defined by procedures and mechanisms that allow adver-
saries, even enemies, to talk to each other. Protocol pervades diploma-
cy because it is there to minimize friction and enable dialogue, or at 
least communication, in an environment where there is animosity and 
lack of trust. To identify ‘dialogue’ as a central tool of foreign policy 
is to say that diplomacy is important to foreign policy, which goes 
without saying.  What is at stake in the identification of dialogue as 
central to foreign policy is, first, the idea that one should talk to every 
one – even those who advance values and objectives that are diametri-
cally opposed to one’s own. Second, there is the implicit assumption 
that dialogue as such can have a transformative effect on the behav-
iour, perhaps even on the values, of actors who define their identity 
and culture in opposition to those of others.  
 
This report explores the nature and effects of dialogue in times of cri-
ses. We analyse three distinct crises where fundamental values have 
been at stake and where there has been considerable uncertainty on 
both sides about the intentions and actions of the other. In focus here 
are the evolving Russo–Georgian conflict, the conflict between West-
ern powers and Libya from the late 1990s onwards, and the conflict 
over Iran’s nuclear programme over the past decade. In particular, we 
explore how communication among stakeholders has evolved over 
time, and how it looked prior to and during the ‘peak’ of each conflict. 
We ask three inter-related questions: 
 
1. What was the character of the dialogue between the actors pri-
or to, during, and after the ‘peak’ of the conflict/crisis? 
2. To what extent has the dialogue been successful? 
3. What determines whether a dialogue can succeed or not?  
 
In the following, we explain why we have chosen to focus on dia-
logue; we discuss the literature on conflict resolution and the role of 
dialogue, and highlight some central themes that run through the three 
case studies.  
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Dialogue in time of crisis 
Dialogue implies a willingness to learn and be persuaded by the force 
of the better argument. As such, dialogue is something of a paradox in 
world politics: while dialogue is a defining feature of diplomacy and 
is frequently called upon to ease tensions and avoid conflicts, it is also 
quite often considered a sign of weakness, since dialogue implies – 
precisely – a willingness to change one’s position and be persuaded by 
others’ arguments (Kagan 2008). This becomes particularly acute 
when conflicts over basic values of a society are at stake and when the 
relationship between those involved has been defined in terms of en-
mity. According to Robert Mnookin, there are times when political 
leaders must quite simply opt to fight rather than talk: ‘In an age of 
terror, our political leaders are faced with this sort of question every 
day. Should we negotiate with the Taliban? Iran? North Korea?’ 
(Mnookin 2010: 1). Subsequent US administrations have adopted this 
stance, opting either to fight (Taliban) or to demand as preconditions 
for talks the very things that are at stake in the conflict (Iran). 
Mnookin’s central point is that it is impossible to enter into a dialogue 
with those whose values one fundamentally rejects without violating 
one’s own integrity.  
 
The Norwegian government has adopted a different stance, rejecting 
the idea that dialogue with those whose values are fundamentally dif-
ferent somehow serves to legitimize them. Instead, the argument is 
that it is precisely when fundamental values collide that it is important 
to engage in dialogue. Norwegian Foreign Minister Støre argues, for 
example, that ‘engaging in dialogue with a group and its members is 
not the same thing as legitimizing its goals and ideology. Used skilful-
ly, engagement may moderate their policies and behaviour’ (Støre 
2011).  
 
These two positions rest on fundamentally different conceptions of 
what dialogue is and what it can achieve. That makes it important to 
assess empirically how dialogue – in isolation or combined with other 
factors – may help to shape outcomes. Can dialogue, by itself, help to 
change actors’ behaviour? Is dialogue always a positive thing? Can 
other polity tools – such as sanctions – operate effectively in combina-
tion with and through the medium of dialogue? Studying the behav-
iour of states in time of crisis – when there are not only conflicting 
values but also uncertainty about the intentions of the other – offers a 
good vantage point from which to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of dialogue as a tool of foreign policy.  
 
In a crisis, there is uncertainty as to what constitutes an appropriate or 
effective course of action to advance given interests. Just what those 
interests are can be hard to pin down. Moreover, diplomacy is at heart 
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about keeping on talking in order to communicate interests and to 
keep the door open for political solutions (precisely through dialogue). 
As such, the resilience of dialogue is best measured in times of crises, 
when both time and the willingness to compromise are often in short 
supply. For the purpose of this report, we define a ‘crisis’ as a set of 
interlinked events where i) there is uncertainty on the part of actors 
about how best to advance their interests; ii) there are clashing values 
and interests, with high stakes involved; and iii) the actors are unsure 
about the facts of the situation and about the strategies of other actors.  
What do we know about inter-cultural dialogue?  
By ‘dialogue’ we mean the exchange of ideas or opinions on a particu-
lar issue, with a view to reaching an amicable agreement or settle-
ment. The robustness of dialogue – as a foreign policy tool – will de-
pend crucially on how it functions and shapes actors in different set-
tings. Much hinges on whether dialogue aims to promote understand-
ing, whether it aims to change actors’ identities and interests, or 
whether it (merely) seeks to avoid escalation and the use of violence. 
Moreover, the motivations for engaging in a dialogue may differ. In 
some cases, actors may engage in dialogue for instrumental or tactical 
reasons, with no real commitment to peaceful resolution of the con-
flict in question. In other cases, dialogue may be imposed upon the 
parties by the UN Security Council without their sufficient commit-
ment to reach an agreement. 
 
Here we focus on cases where the parties may not be interested talking 
to each other – and where a breakdown in communication is part of 
the problem, owing in no small part to conflicts over fundamental val-
ues. Efforts to establish dialogue between such parties present special 
challenges. As noted by Jakobson (1960), the quality of any form of 
communication hinges on the context of communication and on the 
ability of the parties to present their message in a manner that is un-
derstandable – that messages can be coded and de-coded to avoid 
misunderstandings. Central here is how the parties to a conflict define 
the cause of a conflict and possible ways of addressing it. As we shall 
see, a shared framework within which the causes of a dispute can be 
assessed and discussed is often lacking, causing the actors to create 
mutually exclusive causal narratives that serve to drive the actors fur-
ther apart.  
Types of dialogue 
There are different types of negotiations, and dialogue plays a differ-
ent role in each of these. It is important to differentiate between them 
as we seek to elucidate the role and character of dialogue in specific 
cases. As an heuristic, we draw on Zartman’s (1988) typology to un-
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derstand the character of the dialogue in our three cases. Zartman dis-
tinguishes between five different approaches: structural, strategic, be-
havioural, processual and integrative (See Table 1.). 
 
Table 1
1
 
 
Approach Basic features Assumptions Limitations 
Structural Focus on means, 
positions and 
power 
Win–lose Lock into positions 
might lead to lost 
opportunity for mutual-
ly beneficial agree-
ment. 
 
Over-emphasis on 
power 
Strategic Focus on ends, 
rationality, posi-
tions 
Win–lose, exist-
ence of optimal 
solutions and 
rationality of 
players 
Excludes use of power, 
players undifferentiated 
(apart from  differences 
in the quality of options 
open to each) 
Behavioural Focus on personal 
traits  
Win–lose, role 
of perceptions 
and expectations 
Emphasis on positions 
Processual 
or Conces-
sion Ex-
change 
Focus on conces-
sion-making, be-
haviour, positions 
Win–lose, 
moves as 
learned (reac-
tive) responses 
Emphasis on positions 
 
Lack of predictiveness 
Integrative Focus on negotia-
tion as a process: 
problem-solving, 
creating value, 
communicating, 
win–win solutions 
Win–win poten-
tial 
Parties should still rec-
ognize and be prepared 
for 
encounters with non-
integrative bargainers 
 
Time-consuming 
 
Structural, strategic and processual approaches to negotiation tend to 
share a distributive understanding of negotiations in the sense that 
these approaches involve the presupposition that negotiations are zero-
sum transactions that have affiliations with different forms of game 
theory. This means that negotiators look at negotiations as contests 
over a limited or fixed amount of some mutually desired benefit 
whereby that the one side’s gain is the other side’s loss. (Alfredson 
and Cungu 2008: 6) 
 
While behavioural approaches also tend to see negotiations as zero-
sum games, these approaches emphasize to a larger extent the role of 
the negotiators’ personalities. In contrast to game theory, which as-
sumes that players in a negotiation ‘game’ are featureless and uni-
formly rational, the behavioural approach highlights human tenden-
                                                 
1  This table is based on Alfredson & Cungu (2008) 
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cies, emotions and skills. According to this approach, individual char-
acteristics play a crucial role in determining the course and the out-
come of negotiated agreements (Alfredson and Cungu 2008: 13-15).  
 
The integrative approach stands in sharp contrast to all the distribu-
tive approaches referred to above, including the Behavioural ap-
proaches, in the sense that it presents the most comprehensive and 
ambitious form of negotiation, and the only one with a win–win po-
tential. Whereas a zero-sum view sees the goal of negotiations as an 
effort to claim one’s share over a ‘fixed slice of the pie’, integrative 
theories and strategies look for ways of creating value, or ‘expanding 
the pie’, so that there is more to share between parties as a result of 
negotiations (Alfredson and Cungu 2008: 15).  
 
The best-known example of the integrative approach is the ‘Harvard 
Negotiation Project’ which builds on the work of Roger Fisher and 
William Ury and their Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements With-
out Giving In, from 1981. They frame negotiation as a three-phase 
process, whose efficiency depends on how negotiators treat four es-
sential elements: interests, people, options and criteria. These four 
elements have, in a later edition, been refashioned into seven elements 
or steps of negotiations (Fisher and Ury 1991).  
 
Step 1: Identifying interests (may be both implicit or explicit 
and may differ from positions – identifying interests may show 
that there are win–win potentials) 
Step 2: People (separate the people from the problem, trust, di-
plomacy, creating personal relationships) 
Step 3: Alternatives (crucial for both parties to recognize their 
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement – BATNA) 
Step 4: Identifying options (this may promote creative thinking 
and expand problem-solving capabilities) 
Step 5: Criteria/legitimacy (agreeing on mutually acceptable 
criteria) 
Step 6: Commitments (all parties must respect the commit-
ments made) 
Step 7 Communications (good communications skills, such as 
being an active listener and learning to deal with difficult emo-
tions) 
Limits of the integrative approach 
Is dialogue always a positive thing? 
Dialogue with counterparts within the same culture, where actors typi-
cally share a set of values enabling communication and the resolution 
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of conflicts, can be difficult enough. Doing so in the international 
realm, where there are often conflicting value systems, and no over-
arching authority to sanction an agreement, is even more difficult. 
There is often a lack of trust, even outright suspicion, and frequently – 
as displayed in the cases in this study – no real interest in reaching a 
consensus. As Jennifer Mitzen has observed, commenting on Haber-
mas’ theory of communicative action, ‘strangers might not see con-
sensus as desirable; they might not recognize one another as capable 
of communicative consensus at all, much less be willing to listen and 
reflect on each other’s arguments’ (Mitzen 2005: 404). On this basis, 
and in an effort to structure the case studies and enable the identifica-
tion of commonalities and lessons learned, we have identified three 
dimensions – secrecy v openness, domestic legitimacy, and emotions 
– that are crucial to any dialogue. Although we use Zartman’s typolo-
gy as a point of departure to unpack the character of dialogue, we sup-
plement it by bringing in the various aspects of international political 
processes that are of the essence. We discuss each in turn.  
Secrecy versus openness 
Because dialogue implies a willingness to be persuaded by argu-
ments, dialogue has the power to undo and remake any existing social 
consensus. As such, it can also lead to violence, in the sense that ar-
gumentative processes face a potentially slippery slope. Without 
some constraint to keep actors committed to resolving their disa-
greements discursively, argues Mitzen, arguments can spill over from 
the conference table to the street, or even to the battlefield (Mitzen 
2005: : 401). Much of what goes on to resolve conflicts takes place 
behind closed doors. Secrecy is often a precondition for getting the 
parties to meet at all. While secrecy may lead to positive results in 
some cases, there are also limits to this approach. First, secret talks do 
not have the same communicative horizon as do public ones. Thus, 
despite the vulnerability of  public dialogue, it may also actually fa-
cilitate compromises – not simply through a process of deliberation 
and the force of the better argument, but due to what Jon Elster terms 
the ‘the civilizing force of hypocrisy’. He argues:  
 
The presence of a public makes it especially hard to appear motivated merely by 
self-interest. Even if one's fellow assembly members would not be shocked, the 
audience would be. In general, this civilizing force of hypocrisy is a desirable ef-
fect of publicity. […] Publicity does not eliminate base motives, but forces and 
induces speakers to hide them. (Elster 2011: 111) 
 
In other words, even though adversaries in a dialogue say one thing 
and do something very different, the publicness of their statements 
may – over time – force them to align deeds with words, lest they be 
considered hypocritical. Elster also recognizes, however, that this ef-
fect of hypocrisy is not always civilizing, and that there are cultural 
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factors that may prevent compromises for other reasons. As an exam-
ple he refers to societies with strong codes of honour. Here, even an 
individual who does not want to take revenge might be forced to do 
so, to avoid the contempt to which he would otherwise be exposed 
(Elster 2011). These insights, emphasized by both  Elster and Mitzen, 
indicate that the civilizing force of hypocrisy, or what Mitzen calls the 
‘forum effect of talk’, works in the long run, whereas secrecy seems to 
be a precondition for initiating talks and to achieving progress in the 
short run. 
The importance of domestic legitimacy 
Any leader, whether democratically elected or authoritarian, must de-
pend on support from core constituencies for survival. As described in 
Putnam’s model of two-level games (Putnam 1998: 434): ‘domestic 
groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt fa-
vourable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions 
among those groups.’ At the international level, meanwhile, ‘national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressure, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign de-
velopments’ (ibid.) 
 
It is easy to think that this logic is valid only in democracies, but even 
authoritarian regimes need a certain degree of support in their domes-
tic population (Eriksen and Nordhaug 2006). This means that analyses 
of inter-cultural negotiations must take into consideration both levels 
also in the non-democratic negotiations parties. As we shall see, shifts 
in the distribution of power at the domestic level have significant im-
pact – positively or negatively – on the dynamics of the negotiations 
under analysis here.  
The importance of emotions 
For Dominique Moïsi (2009), the feelings of fear, humiliation and 
hope are central to the types of conflicts that we analyse here. He ar-
gues that the West has been dominated by a culture of fear – fear of 
the ‘Other’ and of foreign cultures – because it anxiously tries to 
maintain global dominance. In the Arab and Muslim world, a culture 
of humiliation is in operation, which feeds into Islamic extremism, 
leading to hatred of the West. Meanwhile, much of Asia has been able 
to concentrate on building a better future, creating a culture of hope. 
These moods, of course, are not universal within each region, and 
there are some areas, like Russia and parts of Latin America, that 
seem to display all of these simultaneously. 
 
Coleman (2011) has picked up on the centrality of emotions, arguing 
that when emotions overshadow how the actors define what the con-
18  Pernille Rieker and Ole Jacob Sending (eds) 
flict is about, the much-lauded integrative approach described above 
simply will not work. Conflicts that are fuelled by emotions, Coleman 
argues, are highly destructive and make up an estimated 5% of the 
conflicts that are seemingly intractable.  
 
Defenders of the integrative approach, like Roger Fisher, would say 
that one should always negotiate, and Coleman would concur while 
also noting that dialogue is no panacea and that addressing the emo-
tional aspect is crucial. Others, like Robert Mnookin (2010), would 
hold that there are also times when one should engage the enemy on 
the battlefield rather than at the negotiations table. He argues that one 
should not engage with actors whose values fundamentally contradict 
one’s own, as that may serve to legitimize the former. Both Fisher and 
Mnookin were called to give George Bush advice in 2001 on how to 
respond to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar’s offer to negoti-
ate. Fisher argued that the Bush administration should accept the offer, 
because one should always try to resolve conflict through a problem-
solving approach to negotiation based on the interests of the parties. 
By contrast, Mnookin argued that the offer should be refused, as there 
was no point in negotiating with the Taliban at that time.  
Structure of the case studies 
This present study is a comparative one. The research questions, pre-
sented above, are investigated in each case, following a template that 
runs as follows: An introductory section introduces what the conflict 
is about, how it has evolved, and who are the main stakeholders. Sub-
sequent sections are organized chronologically, analysing the evolu-
tion of the conflict, identifying ‘tipping points’ and seeking to eluci-
date the dynamics of the dialogue in each case. The authors employ 
the analytical tools discussed in this introduction, trying to assess how 
they fit each specific case.  
What makes dialogue work or not? 
The Russia–Georgia Case 
Jakub M. Godzimirski (NUPI) 
Introduction 
This study examines the role of dialogue in conflict prevention and 
solution in the context of the five-day war fought between Georgia 
and Russia in August 2008. The outbreak of open hostilities on the 
night of 7/8 August that year resulted in a full-scale military conflict 
between the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation. When 
Georgian troops were ordered to restore order in the breakaway region 
of South Ossetia and launched an assault on the city of Tskhinvali, 
where Russia had a contingent of peacekeepers who came under at-
tack and suffered some losses, Russian policy-makers decided to re-
spond by launching a full-scale military operation in which targets on 
the whole Georgian territory were attacked and destroyed. The official 
Georgian justification for armed intervention in South Ossetia was an 
attempt at restoring constitutional order in the breakaway region of 
South Ossetia. Moscow’s official justification was the need to protect 
Russian citizens and soldiers in the conflict area, to prevent the geno-
cide of the South Ossetians and, as Russian President Medvedev him-
self put it, ‘to coerce Georgia to peace’. After five days of heavy 
fighting, with hundreds of casualties on both sides of the frontline, the 
two parties agreed to accept the conditions of a ceasefire negotiated by 
French diplomats and the French president acting on behalf of the 
whole EU.  
 
The indirect dialogue between Russia and Georgia facilitated by this 
French shuttle diplomacy paid off. Hostilities ended, Georgia could 
set about healing its wounds, while Russia decided to recognize the 
independence of the two areas, formally a part of the Georgian state, 
and to give them security guarantees against possible Georgian actions 
in the future. The independence of Georgia was saved, but Georgia 
lost control over much of its territory, and the prospects of regaining 
control are today much dimmer than at the outbreak of the conflict. 
Russia won a small victorious war, taught Georgia’s President Saa-
kashvili a painful lesson, achieved some of its long-term strategic ob-
jectives in the region, apparently reaffirmed its status as a regional and 
European great power – but also strained its relations with the EU, 
NATO and the US, made many others worry about its intentions, and 
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faced what some have described a ‘strategic solitude’ (Gomart 2008: 
50).   
 
The August war remains a watershed event in the recent history of 
Russia’s relations with the post-Soviet states and the West, and as 
such deserves academic attention. Although dialogue and negotiations 
had not prevented the outbreak of the war, they played a major part in 
putting an end to the hostilities and in preventing this local conflict 
from spiralling out of control. We need to explore the role of dialogue 
in that context, and ask what other elements were central.  
 
This study is divided into several sections, focused on answering three 
important questions: 
 
 Why the dialogue was successful, or not? 
 What was the character of the dialogue between the actors pri-
or to, during, and after the peak of the crisis? 
 Can we identify ‘tipping points’ beyond which dialogue was of 
little relevance? 
 
The first section presents the historical background of the conflict and 
the turning points in its development, focusing on the moments when 
dialogue seemed a viable option and those when dialogue seemed im-
possible. In the next section, we turn to the failed attempts at finding a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, and why the conflict-prevention work 
of several actors did not result in dialogue or yield the expected results 
– instead, the conflict spiralled out of control. In the third part we ex-
plore the role of dialogue and negotiations in putting an end to the 
armed phase of the conflict and preventing it from expanding to be-
come a threat to European and even global peace. The focus will be on 
the broader structural framework conditions, on the strategic ration-
ales of the actors involved, and, in line with Moïsi’s suggestion (Moïsi 
2009) on emotions that either facilitated or hampered dialogue. This 
specific case provides useful insights into what makes dialogue and 
negotiations possible and fruitful – while also revealing the limitations 
of an approach based on dialogue and negotiated solution of conflicts 
in situations when actors misread each other’s intentions or are unwill-
ing to engage in dialogue because the stakes are too high, the strategic 
positions irreconcilable and the emotions too difficult to control.  
Georgia, breakaway regions, Russia: historical background and turning 
points 
The August 2008 conflict dates back to the period of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and its aftermath. The main bone of contention was 
the status of the two regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – on the 
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territory of the newly-established Georgian state, but there were also 
broader strategic ramifications involving relations between the Rus-
sian Federation and the 14 other post-Soviet states, and the way those 
fifteen new actors were to relate to other centres of global and regional 
power, not least the increasingly integrating Europe and the trans-
Atlantic community.  
 
Here we will not analyse all the phases of that conflict within the 
framework of that study, as there is abundant literature on that topic. 
(For a good overview see Asmus 2010; Blandy 2009; Charap and 
Welt 2011; Flikke and Godzimirski 2007; Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009; Pukhov and 
Glantz 2010) Instead, we attempt a bird’s-eye view, seeking to identi-
fy key actors, their interests and approaches and those factors that 
made the dialogue a non-workable solution in August 2008, as well as 
those that got both Russia and Georgia to agree – with the help of oth-
ers – on cessation of hostilities. 
 
For deeper insight into the complexity of that conflict, a brief histori-
cal background is needed, not least since the armed clash that started 
on 7 August was, as clearly stated in the 2009 IIFFM report, ‘only the 
culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations 
and incidents’ (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009: 11).  
 
There were several turning points in the history of that conflict. The 
most crucial ones were Georgia’s de facto defeat in the war against 
South Ossetia in 1992, resulting in the signing of the Dagomys/Sochi 
Accord on 24 June 1992; and Georgia’s even more painful defeat in 
war against Abkhazia one year later (For Abkhaz interpretaion of the 
events see RAD 2008). 
 
The deadlock – often referred to as ‘frozen conflict’ – continued, with 
some ups and downs, until August 2008, when full-scale war broke 
out again. Even during this long interim period the situation fluctuated 
– there were several attempts at finding a diplomatic and negotiated 
solution but the parties to the conflict also resorted to weapons as a 
means of dealing with the deadlocked situation. The 2003 power shift 
in Georgia, with the ousting of Eduard Shevardnadze and the ascent to 
power of Mikheil Saakashvili, marked another important turning 
point. Also the Georgian operation in May 2004, which resulted in the 
ousting of the Moscow-friendly Adjara leader Aslan Abashidze ac-
companied by an apparent lack of reaction on the part of Russia, was 
important, as it established a pattern of action that the new Georgian 
authorities thought could be useful also in dealing with other breaka-
way regions.  
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Further noteworthy factors in shaping the conflict dynamics in the re-
gion include Saakashvili’s  July 2004 renunciation of the 1992 Da-
gomys agreement regulating situation in the conflict areas, Tbilisi’s 
attempts at finding new solutions and at internationalization of the 
conflict, and the drive to join NATO signalled by the new Georgian 
leadership (Silayev 2009).   
 
In June 2007, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili 
decided to open dialogue with Russia on a solution to the South Osse-
tian conflict. Saakashvili called Putin and presented his plan, and both 
agreed that their foreign ministers were to meet. At meeting of 
Bezhuashvili and Lavrov on 24 June 2007 in Istanbul, the Georgians 
proposed to make Moscow guarantor of the peace in the region and to 
introduce a new travel regime for South and North Ossetians. There 
was also an economic dimension to the deal, as several joint energy 
and transport projects were to be developed. Settlement of the conflict 
would be based on same provisions as the 1921 Treaty of Kars; more-
over, Georgia was now offering Russia a legal voice in its internal af-
fairs in South Ossetia (Asmus 2010),84). However, work on the new 
agreement was killed by a leak to the Russian press.  
 
In the autumn of 2007, Bezhuashvili and Lavrov met again in New 
York to discuss problems in bilateral relations, with the growing ten-
sions between Georgia and Russia and the risk of war between the 
countries. According to Bezhuashvili’s account, Lavrov told him that 
Moscow would never allow Georgia to join NATO and go West 
(Asmus 2010: 85).  
 
Western policy towards Georgia, and relations between Russia and the 
West, were also important factors. In May 2005 US President George 
W. Bush paid a visit to Georgia, declaring it a ‘beacon of democracy’ 
in the region. In late 2007 and early 2008 Georgia, supported by many 
of its Western allies, undertook substantial efforts to become eligible 
for MAP – the Membership Action Plan that would open for Georgian 
membership in NATO. However, the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 
April 2008 did not grant Georgia MAP status, although the final dec-
laration stated that the Alliance welcomed ‘Ukraine’s and Georgia’s 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO’ and had agreed 
that ‘these countries will become members of NATO’.2   
 
What seems to be another key turning point in the conflict was the 
recognition by many important members of the international commu-
nity of Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence on 17 February 2008, 
and Russia’s reactions (Asmus 2010: 105-106 and 142-144; Silayev 
2009: 1-4).  
                                                 
2  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm 
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On 6 March 2008, Russia lifted the CIS sanctions against Abkhazia 
that had been imposed in 1996. One week later, the Russian Duma 
met to discuss Russia’s reactions to South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
calls for recognition of their independence and on 21 March the lower 
house of the Russian parliament issued a special resolution endorsing 
their request. On 14 April 2008 Nezavisimaya Gazeta published a 
lengthy article in which an unidentified Russian diplomat was quoted 
as saying that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recom-
mended President Medvedev to recognize the independence of Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia in two cases – if the process of Georgia join-
ing NATO were to start, or in the case of the Georgian military inter-
vention in one of the areas (Perevozkina 2008). Finally, on 16 April 
2008 Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian MFA to help the populations 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
 
To prevent the crisis from escalating, a diplomatic process was started 
by several actors. As regards the Russian–Georgian conflict brewing 
in spring 2008, Washington made diplomatic efforts that tried to per-
suade both Georgia and Russia to avoid a military solution; further, 
Berlin that sent its foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who 
launched his own proposal for settlement of the conflict, effectively 
torpedoed only weeks before the outbreak of the war; and Tbilisi in 
April 2008 offered broad autonomy to Abkhazia (Asmus 2010: 144).  
Despite all these diplomatic efforts, tensions continued to mount in the 
region, not least due to increased military activity and presence in the 
area. On the Russian side of the Caucasus the 58th Army conducted 
its military exercises Kavkaz 2008 with 8000 troops, while on the 
Georgian side of the range a US–Georgian military exercise Immedi-
ate Response was held at the same time, involving 1000 US and 600 
Georgian troops (Blandy 2009). 
 
On 2 August 2008 the Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur 
Yakobashvili proposed direct talks to the Ossetians (Novikova 2008). 
In a final effort to calm the tense situation Georgian President Mikheil 
Saakashvili delivered an address on 7 August 2008 in which he pro-
claimed a unilateral ceasefire, and offered the Ossetians Russian-
guaranteed autonomy within the Republic of Georgia. Yakobashvili 
was dispatched to Tskhinvali to try establish direct contact with both 
the Russian and South Ossetian authorities, but failed (Asmus 2010, 
33–34). Although South Ossetians rejected all attempts at communica-
tion and mediation, Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire at 
18.40 hours on 7 August. Then at 23.35 hours he ordered his troops to 
start a defensive operation to protect civilians in the Tskhinvali region, 
to neutralize the positions from which fire against civilians, Georgian 
peacekeeping units and police originated, and to halt the movement of 
regular units of the Russian Federation through the Roki Tunnel inside 
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the Tskhinvali Region (Der Spiegel staff 2008; Felgengauer 2008; 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia 2009: vol.1, 19-20).  
 
Fully-fledged war in the Caucasus was now a fact, but from the outset 
of that armed phase of the conflict new diplomatic efforts were made 
to put an end to hostilities and to prevent the conflict from spiralling 
out of control. The first to propose a ceasefire was Condoleezza Rice, 
who already on 8 August presented a three-point ceasefire plan during 
her talks with Russian MFA Sergei Lavrov (Asmus 2010: 40). That 
plan called for Russian and Georgian forces to be withdrawn to the 6 
August status; for the establishment of a new international peacekeep-
ing force in the region; and for holding new elections in South Osse-
tia. Russia rejected the plan, and in the meantime the conflict spread to 
Abkhazia. On 9 August 2008, French Foreign Minister Bernard 
Kouchner, acting on behalf of the entire EU and accompanied by 
Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb representing the OSCE, 
visited Tbilisi and presented a draft ceasefire agreement to President 
Saakashvili, who accepted the proposal and ordered his own forces to 
begin a ceasefire. Moscow rejected this call for ceasefire, and accused 
Georgia of continuing military operations. It was not until 12 August, 
a few hours before French President Sarkozy was to arrive in Mos-
cow, that President Medvedev ordered Russian troops to halt their op-
erations in Georgia.  
 
The parties agreed on a six-point plan to put an end to hostilities. The 
plan provided for (1) a commitment to the non-use of force; (2) a 
permanent end to all military operations; (3) ensuring free access to 
humanitarian aid; (4) the return of Georgian armed forces to where 
they were normally deployed; (5) the withdrawal of Russian Federa-
tion armed forces to their positions from before the start of offensive 
operations; pending the development of ‘international mechanisms’, 
the Russian peacekeeping forces (i.e. the armed forces of the Russian 
Federation) were to undertake ‘additional security measures’; (6) the 
opening of an international debate on the status of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, and on the means to ensure their security.  
 
The military phase of the conflict had ended, but the conflict as such 
remained unresolved. The parties agreed to a ceasefire, but Moscow’s 
decision on 26 August to recognize the independence of the two 
breakaway Georgian regions and to guarantee their security against 
any Georgian actions changed the situation on the ground. On the fol-
lowing day, Georgia severed diplomatic relations with the Russian 
Federation.  
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In the course of one week – between 7 and 12 August – the world wit-
nessed both a failure and a success of diplomacy. On the one hand, 
diplomacy and negotiations had not been able to prevent the outbreak 
of the Georgian–Russian war; on the other hand, they did succeed in 
putting an end to the armed clash and in preventing the conflict from 
spiralling out of control, into a conflict between Russia and the West. 
Thus we should ask: what made diplomacy fail prior to the outbreak 
of open hostilities, and what were the factors that made it work only 
five days later?  
 
In order to understand why dialogue and negotiations did not work 
and the conflict could develop into a full-scale war on 7 August 2008, 
and what made dialogue and negotiations work only five days later, 
we will use a framework for the study of negotiations proposed by 
Zartman (Zartman 1988).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this report, the integrative ap-
proach is the most comprehensive and the only one with a win–win 
potential. However, in order to be able to present a plausible interpre-
tation of the developments in Russian–Georgian conflict we should 
look into the explanatory power of all five approaches. In our interpre-
tation, the war broke out largely because the parties to the frozen con-
flicts in Georgia failed to engage in dialogue with a win–win potential. 
This fact alone makes the use of the integrative approach much less 
convincing, which also explains why this interpretation of that failure 
requires us to focus on other factors and explanations.  
Poles too far apart and tunnel vision – or why dialogue did not work 
To present a plausible explanation of the failure to reach a negotiated 
settlement of the conflicts in question we have to identify the key pa-
rameters of the conflicts and then enquire into the explanatory power 
of other approaches proposed by Zartman. It seems that not only struc-
tural and strategic factors can help to explain why the conflict devel-
oped into a full-scale war. Understanding the conflict dynamics also 
requires a focus on behavioural aspects, such as the personal traits of 
actors involved, as well as on processual aspects of the dialogue that 
did not work. The integrative approach can, on the other hand, help us 
in explaining why dialogue and diplomacy could prove successful af-
ter the outbreak of hostilities.  
 
All the key parameters of the conflict were set already after the end of 
the open hostilities between Georgian and the breakaway regions in 
1992 and 1993. The two breakaway regions had gained de facto inde-
pendence from Georgia. Georgia had lost control over those territo-
ries, and re-establishing sovereignty over those areas became a key 
point on the Georgian political agenda. Russia could adopt a rather 
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ambiguous position in that conflict as it was expected to act as an im-
partial peacekeeper acting on behalf of the whole CIS, but was also, 
and rightly so, suspected of having its own political and strategic 
agenda not always comparable with this expected impartiality. The 
international community showed some interest in helping the parties 
to find a workable solution and in preventing conflict escalation, 
through the establishment of UNOMIG and the Group of Friends of 
Georgia (France, Germany, Russia, USA, and UK), but the role of in-
ternational community was rather limited and its efforts brought rather 
disappointing results.  
 
All those factors have also contributed to making the situation in the 
conflict area much tenser and less predictable (Halbach 2009; Nodia 
2007). Georgia suspected Russia of undermining its position in the 
region and of seeking closer cooperation with breakaway regions as a 
means of preventing Georgia’s closer cooperation with West; Russia 
in turn suspected Georgia of undermining Russia’s position in the 
whole post-Soviet space by proposing another model of political cul-
ture that could have – and had – some appeal elsewhere in the post-
Soviet space, and of being a Western ‘agent’ and instrument in un-
dermining the geopolitical position of Russia in an area where it felt 
vulnerable (Scott 2007). These suspicions led Russia to treat the con-
flict between Georgia and Abkhazia/South Ossetia in instrumental 
manner, to gain a strategic upper hand over Georgia and lessen its 
chances of becoming a full member of Western institutions, first and 
foremost NATO.  
 
The West – the USA in particular – also established a stronger pres-
ence in the region, firstly by giving support to the Shevardnadze re-
gime and then by supporting Georgia’s and Saakashvili’s aspirations 
to join NATO and in the longer perspective the EU (Larrabee 2009; 
Lukyanov 2009; Missiroli 2009). This increasing Western strategic 
presence in what Russia perceives as its own strategic backyard an-
noyed some circles in Moscow (Stepanova 2008). In February 2007 
then-President Vladimir Putin fired a heavy anti-Western salvo at the 
Munich security conference
3
, accusing the West of trying to establish 
a global system with ‘one centre of authority, one centre of force, one 
centre of decision-making’, of imposing new dividing lines and walls 
and of ‘trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument de-
signed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of 
countries’. He further accused the USA of overstepping its national 
borders in every way. Putin did not mention the USA and the Western 
presence in and support for Georgia directly, but the situation in 
Georgia had been a core problem in Russia–Western relations since 
the Istanbul Summit in 1999, when Russia had to promise to withdraw 
                                                 
3  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html 
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its troops from that country, a process that was postponed many times 
and has contributed to increasing tensions in the region, in bilateral 
relations between Georgia and Russia, and in relations between Russia 
and the West.  
The structural perspective  
The conflict between Georgia and Russia has developed from a post-
Soviet regional issue to an issue that has been interpreted in a much 
broader context, especially after the US presence in Georgia increased 
and Georgia was given a promise of full NATO membership 
(Dyakova 2010). The five-day war was to a certain extent Russia’s 
war by proxy with the USA and the West. The USA made several at-
tempts at getting Saakashvili to understand that neither the USA nor 
NATO would intervene in the case of outbreak of open hostilities be-
tween Georgia and Russia. The line of action chosen by Saakashvili 
challenged therefore not only Russia, but was also a surprise to his 
close allies who were caught unprepared and had problems finding a 
proper response (Klussmann 2009). Saakashvili’s action and Russia’s 
reactions strained relations between Russia and the USA / NATO, 
thereby directly impacting on relations between the most important 
elements of the international system (Astrov 2011; Chatham House 
2008; Gahrton 2010). It was not only Georgia that lost in that five-day 
war – also the West’s will and ability to contain Russian power and to 
manage conflicts in the post-Soviet space was put in question. Russia 
fought and won what is sometimes referred to as ‘ a diagnostic war’ – 
an operation in which not only Georgia was defeated on the battle-
ground, but also NATO’s credibility as a military alliance was dealt a 
heavy blow (Alexandrov 2010).  
The strategic perspective  
When the conflict between Georgia and Russia entered its most in-
tense and armed phase in August 2008, the two parties directly in-
volved held completely different strategic perspectives. For Georgia it 
was the matter of national survival – or at least the survival of the cur-
rent regime; for Russia it was a matter of retaking the lead, showing 
strategic (limited) capability and resolution in addressing a burning 
issue, and a way of containing the Western advances into what Russia 
considers its own exclusive sphere of influence (Felgengauer 2008). 
Russia also used this opportunity to punish a regime that challenged 
its dominant position in the post-Soviet space, to undermine the credi-
bility of the USA and NATO, and to show the limits of what is some-
times perceived as waning US power.  
 
At the core of the conflict were relations between Russia, Georgia, 
separatist movements in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and 
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Western institutions (the EU, NATO) and Georgia’s future member-
ship in NATO. What was at stake was the independence of Georgia, 
its territorial integrity, Georgia’s possible membership in NATO and 
the EU, relations between Georgia and Russia, between Georgia and 
Georgian territories that had declared their independence, and between 
Georgia and Russia, and relations between Russia and NATO/the EU. 
Due to the US direct engagement in Georgia dating back to the late 
Clinton and early Bush eras, US–Russian relations were apparently at 
stake as well.  
 
For both Georgian and Russian leaders, involvement in the conflict 
was also a way of legitimizing their power in the eyes of their domes-
tic audiences. Saakashvili treated the regaining of the ‘lost territories’ 
as a way of strengthening his position in the domestic arena. For 
Putin, tough statements on Saakashvili and his policies were a way of 
showing himself a capable and decisive leader. Medvedev in turn was 
also forced to show his decisiveness in dealing with an important issue 
only three months after taking over from Putin. The poor personal 
chemistry between Putin and Saakashvili and problems in contacts 
between Saakashvili and Medvedev made it easier for all of them to 
present their counterparts as men with whom constructive dialogue 
was simply not possible. In addition, Georgia’s relatively successful 
drive towards reforms and modernization and especially fight against 
corruption were seen as posing a challenge to Russia’s dominant posi-
tion in the CIS area. 
 
Although Moscow could fear the effect of successful separatist 
movement on its own territory in the Northern Caucasus, where Rus-
sia had gone to war twice in the 1990s in order to prevent Chechnya’s 
drive for independence, this did not prevent Russia from supporting 
separatist movements in Georgia. The will to punish Georgia that 
made negotiations and dialogue so difficult was also caused partly by 
the fact that Georgia and Chechen separatists sometimes worked to-
gether in addressing regional issues: that infuriated the Kremlin and 
led Russia to threaten preventive strikes on Georgian territory.  
 
Also several other geopolitical considerations worked against talks 
between Russia and Georgia. Russia treated the area as its own strate-
gic backyard, and was not willing to let other powers play a more im-
portant part in setting the regional agenda. Georgia’s drive towards 
NATO membership was viewed as a strategic challenge, likewise 
closer Georgian–US security cooperation. Russia had sided first in-
formally, then formally, with the separatist movements in Georgia and 
played a crucial part in securing their ‘survivability’. The outbreak of 
hostilities in August 2008 was caused in part by the growing Russian 
military presence in the region and by what regional separatist leaders 
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could interpret as Russia’s protection against Georgia. The outbreak of 
large-scale hostilities provided the Kremlin with an opportunity to 
‘punish’ Saakashvili for his pro-Western policy, give him a bloody 
nose, test the US and NATO will and ability to react, and perhaps 
‘compromise’ the Western security guarantee.  
 
However, the outbreak of hostilities on 7 August was not solely the 
result of the diverging interests and policies of the parties directly in-
volved: it was also the consequence of what the report of the IIFF 
commission described as ‘the failure of the international community, 
including the UN Security Council, to act swiftly and resolutely 
enough in order to control the ever-mounting tensions prior the out-
break of armed conflict’(Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009: 12). The outbreak of the war 
in the Caucasus was also viewed as a clear example of the failure of 
the international society to prevent war and as an example of great-
power inability to manage emerging conflicts. As noted by one com-
mentator: ‘'from the point of view of successful great power manage-
ment.... this war should not have happened in the first place’ (Astrov 
2011: 2). 
 
The history of the conflict between Georgia on the one hand and its 
breakaway regions and Russia on the other hand goes back to the early 
1990s. Several rounds of talks between the parties all failed to produce 
results satisfactory to all parties involved. The fact that the conflict 
again entered into a military phase in August 2008 and resulted in 
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by 
Russia and six other states bears witness to the ineffectiveness of dia-
logue as an instrument of conflict settlement in that particular case.  
 
Georgia and other actors had presented various proposals for settle-
ment of the conflict between the Georgian central authorities and 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, without success. Russia played a double 
role in those attempts. On the one hand, it was the guarantor of the 
agreements on cessation of hostilities reached in Dagomys in 1992 
between South Ossetia and Georgia and in Sochi in 1993 between 
Georgia and Abkhazia, and it sought to promote peace and stability in 
the region (Markedonov 2007, 2008). On the other hand, there have 
been several reports of Russian troops siding with the rebels, or at 
least providing them with heavy weapons used to defeat the Georgian 
units. Moreover, Russia deployed, on behalf of the CIS, several 
peacekeeping units in the conflict areas, but these units were accused 
of not being impartial and of siding with the separatists. Thus the 
Georgian authorities saw Russia not as an impartial mediator but as a 
party to the conflict, a party that tended to side with the Abkhaz and 
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the South Ossetians. This perception of Russia as a party to the con-
flict made any Russian–Georgian dialogue a challenging task.  
 
In addition to those bilateral issues, escalation of the conflict was fur-
ther spurred by various other circumstances. These included the ap-
proaching end of the second term of US President George W. Bush, 
which made the US administration a lame duck; the EU crisis follow-
ing the Irish referendum; summer holidays in Europe and  the USA, 
which slowed down key actors’ reaction times; and the start of the 
Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, probably seen by Georgia and 
Russia alike as an opportune moment to start a campaign and check 
whether the other side would dare to escalate the conflict, which might 
be viewed as breaching ‘the Olympic peace’ and used in the propa-
ganda war that would follow the armed clash (Menkiszak 2008; As-
mus 2010). 
 
There have been many stated and non-stated objectives of Russian ac-
tion in Georgia. According to Russian official statements, the inter-
vention was aimed at protecting Russian citizens living in South Osse-
tia, protecting Russian peacekeepers stationed there, preventing the 
genocide in South Ossetia by the Saakashvili regime, and what the 
Russian official discourse termed enforcing peace on Georgia. 
 
Many independent observers have seen the goals of Russia’s actions 
completely differently. According to the Polish think-tank OSW 
(Menkiszak 2008), Russia had not only seized the whole of South Os-
setia and Abkhazia, but had also occupied north-western Georgia. The 
invasion is a manifestation of Russia's determination to defend its in-
fluence in the CIS area, and is intended to demonstrate both Russia's 
status as a world power and the weakness and helplessness of the 
West (particularly the USA) to the countries of the region and the 
Russian political classes. Moscow is apparently trying to establish a 
permanent military presence in the separatist regions, which it hopes 
to separate from Georgia permanently and also to provoke a political 
crisis and a change of leadership in that country. 
 
Similar readings of the Russian action prevailed among many Western 
observers and experts, who also underlined the lack of strategic re-
straint and intelligence on the part of Mikheil Saakashvili as a factor 
contributing to the conflict reaching the armed phase (Allison 2008, 
2009; Klussmann 2009).   
The behavioural perspective 
What complicated the situation on the ground even further was the 
ascent to political power of a new generation of politicians in Russia 
and in Georgia, representing two completely different political cul-
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tures, two different visions for the development of their countries, of 
their bilateral relations and their relations with the outside world. The 
two leaders – Saakashvili in Georgia and Putin in Russia – chose to 
base their policies on opposing sets of ideas: Saakashvili advocated 
further democratization of Georgia and strengthening of ties between 
Georgia and Western institutions, whereas Putin embarked on a politi-
cal project that resulted in the construction of a hybrid semi-
authoritarian regime and a worsening of Russian relations with the 
West. The ascent to power of Vladimir Putin in Russia in 1999/2000 
and of Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia in 2003 opened a new chapter 
not only in bilateral Russian–Georgian relations but also in relations 
between Russia and the post-Soviet space, in Russia’s relations with 
the West and not least in Georgia’s relations with the West and its re-
lations with Russia and other post-Soviet states.  
 
What proved to be an additional element that complicated relations 
between Georgia and Russia and prevented them from entering into 
constructive dialogue were the personalities of the two leaders. Even 
Saakashvili’s friends in the West described him as having hard time 
practising patience (Asmus 2010: 85). Putin was also known to be hot-
tempered, vindictive and unforgiving as well as calculating and un-
scrupulous. The diverging political agendas and these difficult person-
al traits led to bad personal chemistry between Saakashvili and Putin, 
with each suspecting the other of playing a double game (Asmus 
2010: 56). Also the propaganda campaigns that depicted the two lead-
ers as having hidden agendas and lacking a common sense had a nega-
tive effect on attempts at finding a negotiated solution to the conflict 
(Zharov and Sheviakov 2009). Russian official propaganda portrayed 
Saakashvili as an irresponsible ‘madman’ and hothead with serious 
mental problems (Ruchkin 2008), whereas the Georgian side present-
ed Putin as a Russian imperialist and the worst enemy of the young 
Georgian democracy  (Georgia 2009); these latter views featured in 
many Western interpretations as well (Blandy 2009; IISS 2008). 
 
Personal factors seem therefore to have played a major part in the es-
calation of the conflict. In addition to the fact that Saakashvili’s drive 
towards closer cooperation with the West was seen as posing a strate-
gic threat to Russia’s interests in the region, the personal chemistry 
between Saakashvili and Putin was bad. Although there were some 
hopes that Medvedev’s formal ascent to power in May 2008 and his 
seemingly softer approach might change the situation and that person-
al animosities would no longer figure so strongly in conflict manage-
ment, these expectations were quickly shattered when Medvedev 
adopted an even more hawkish approach to cooperation with Saa-
kashvili, with Putin still calling the shots behind the scenes.  
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There is much to indicate that Russian policy-makers, knowing how to 
provoke Saakashvili, decided to set a trap to get him to act as they ex-
pected – and then compromise him in the West and make his Western 
partners doubt whether he was the right man to be invited to the West-
ern club. The Russians saw in Saakashivili a man who seemed incapa-
ble of showing the necessary strategic restraint and strategic intelli-
gence and acted in a way that was very much counterproductive 
(Blandy 2009).  
Role of dialogue in this period, preliminary conclusions  
Once these incompatibilities came to the fore in Georgia, where both 
sides were pursuing interests defined in terms of their conflicting self-
understanding in an atmosphere already heavily tinged with the nega-
tive legacy of the Cold War, armed conflict was perhaps the inevitable 
outcome (Papkova 2011: 58). The key problem was that the positions 
of parties were incompatible, and there was scant space for dialogue 
as they could not agree on the basic principles for such dialogue. 
Georgia was sending mixed signals that could be misread by the au-
thorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; Abkhazia was not willing to 
accept the return of Georgian refugees as this could alter the demo-
graphic balance and in the long run de-legitimize its claim for inde-
pendence; the South Ossetians feared Georgian domination; and Rus-
sia was not interested in letting Georgia join the West. The poles of 
the conflict were so far apart as to render dialogue almost impossible. 
The conflict could be defined as belonging to that 5 per cent of intrac-
table conflicts that are highly destructive, never-ending, and virtually 
impossible to solve (Coleman 2011). In such a situation, fighting may 
appear as a better option than negotiations (Mnookin 2010). However, 
in making such a decision, the leader must act with some prudence, 
and consider all the pros and cons – which was probably not the case 
with Saakashvili on the night of 7 August.  
 
One of the direct causes of the war was therefore what could be called 
Saakashvili’s ‘tunnel vision’. According to the Georgian interpretation 
of the events leading to the war, Saakashvili’s decision to launch an 
attack on Tskhinvali in the late hours of 7 August was triggered by 
information on the movements of Russian troops through the Roki 
Tunnel he had apparently received from the Georgian intelligence 
(Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia 2009: vol.2, 220-221). According to one account (Asmus 
2010), Saakashvili believed that Russian tanks were rolling toward 
him. He felt cornered and concluded that there was no alternative but 
to fight. Saakashvili also hoped that Moscow might back down, as had 
been the case during his intervention in Adjara some years earlier, and 
that the West and above all the USA would intervene diplomatically 
to prevent Russia from acting.   
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Nothing illustrates more clearly the distance between the parties to the 
conflict than their interpretations of what actually happened on the 
night of 7 and 8 August. The official Georgian interpretation is that 
the Russian Federation launched a large-scale invasion on sovereign 
Georgian territory; and that Russia’s use of force that was both illegal 
and unjustified under international law constituted a breach of Geor-
gia’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity and was an act of 
aggression (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009: vol.2, 186). The Russian side, however, de-
scribed the situation as ‘the treacherous attack launched by Georgia 
against the peaceful population of South Ossetia and the Russian 
peacekeepers’, as ‘an unprecedented event in modern history both in 
terms of its recklessness and cruelty’ that ‘demonstrated aggressive 
intent on the part of the Georgian side’ and forced Russia ‘to use its 
inalienable right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter’ (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009: vol.2, 188). 
 
Once the war in Georgia had erupted, the international community 
embarked on a more active policy of conflict management, and a ne-
gotiated solution could be found. True, the situation in the region re-
mained tense and volatile, with many fearing that hostilities might be 
resumed (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009: 12); and the Georgian authorities decided 
on 27 August to severe diplomatic relations with Russia. However, the 
indirect dialogue between Russia and Georgia, initiated by French dip-
lomats acting on behalf of the EU, probably combined with a more 
active US role behind the scenes, made the parties realize that the po-
litical and human costs of continued warfare could prove unacceptably 
high.  
Better late than never, or the talks that did succeed (in part) 
The dialogue that followed and succeeded in putting an end to the 
armed phase of the conflict in August 2008 was not a direct dialogue 
between Georgia and South Ossetia/ Abkhazia/Russia, but a series of 
bilateral dialogues between the French negotiators and Georgia, Rus-
sia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with the results communicated to 
other parties by the French team. One factor facilitating this negotiat-
ed solution was probably the situation as such: Russia had by then 
achieved most of its war objectives; Georgia was on the brink of col-
lapse and had to accept the harsh conditions, while the French negotia-
tors had good contacts in both Moscow and Tbilisi. Moreover, Salome 
Zourabichvili was a former high official in the French MFA who had 
served as French ambassador to Georgia between 2003 and 2004 be-
fore being appointed Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004; 
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and Saakashvili himself had studied at the Strasbourg Human Rights 
International Institute.  
The strategic perspective 
By defeating Georgia on the battleground, Russia proved capable, in 
its own eyes, of dealing with a regional security challenge and sent a 
signal to other powers that their actions in Russia’s backyard would 
not be tolerated. On the other hand, having achieved most of its politi-
cal and military objectives, Russia could afford to show good will and 
accept the conditions proposed by Sarkozy, who had managed to de-
velop relatively good relations with Putin and Medvedev prior to the 
outbreak of the conflict and also enjoyed the trust of Washington due 
to his pro-American turn and Atlantic commitment.  
 
The fact that the French decided to act as intermediaries on behalf of 
the EU made it possible for Sarkozy to present his peace proposals to 
both parties and get them to accept his ideas on how to put an end to 
the armed phase of the conflict. Although the parties accepted the 
conditions, dialogue between them was not opened – but the French 
negotiators managed to conduct the talks that finally put an end to the 
war.  
 
The EU, represented by the French president, managed to get the war-
ring parties to talk (indirectly) one to another, to accept the conditions 
of a ceasefire and to put an end to the armed phase of the conflict. 
This made clear the relevance of the European Union and its strategic 
weight in the region. Even more important from a strategic perspec-
tive was the fact that the EU/Sarkozy managed to persuade 
Putin/Medvedev to stop the Russian military’s push into Georgia and 
their plans for taking Tbilisi and overthrowing the Saakashvili regime. 
Had the Russian forces continued towards Tbilisi, the conflict could 
have spiralled out of control, with unpredictable consequences not on-
ly for the parties directly involved, but also for the region and even for 
the world.  
 
The fact that the end of the armed phase of the conflict could be pre-
sented as an effect of the French president’s mediation and not of US 
pressure on Russia strengthened the impression of the United States as 
less relevant and less capable of shaping the international agenda. On 
the other hand the fact that Sarkozy was acting on behalf of the EU 
and managed to persuade Russia that regime change in Georgia – 
which was probably one of the objectives of the Russian action – 
would be unacceptable, is likely to have strengthened the structural 
power of the EU, which Russia has often viewed as a counterbalance 
to the US presence in Europe and its dominant position in NATO. The 
end of the conflict could therefore be presented as the result of deci-
Inter-cultural dialogue in international crises   35 
 
35 
sions taken by a European concert of powers that had sidelined Wash-
ington and reached a compromise without direct US interference.  
The processual perspective 
Direct talks between Kouchner and Stubb, supported behind the 
scenes by Sarkozy, with Saakashvili and the Medvedev/Putin tandem, 
played a crucial role in preventing escalation of the conflict in August 
2008. The parties agreed to exchange concessions and were persuaded 
by the negotiators to accept a set of conditions and concessions as a 
precondition of the ceasefire that was to enter into force immediately 
after the signing of the agreement. Georgia agreed to accept the effec-
tive loss of control over territories that had been out of Tbilisi’s reach 
since the early 1990s. In spite of that – and the military defeat – the 
incumbent president remained in power and was not ousted: obviously 
Russia’s concession to the French negotiators. In addition, Russia de-
cided to halt the movement of its forces towards Tbilisi and to pull out 
its troops from what was undisputed Georgian territory. 
 
Moreover, the six-point peace plan proposed by Sarkozy outlined the 
agreed criteria of the ceasefire. The parties were to agree to abstain 
from the use of force, to a definitive cessation of hostilities, to free 
access to humanitarian aid, and to the withdrawal of armed forces to 
their permanent positions and to the line where they had been sta-
tioned prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In addition it was agreed that 
discussions on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would 
be internationalized. During the negotiations, the parties – Georgia in 
particular – had to accept some modifications to the text. Especially 
important here was the rejection of the idea that refugees from the 
conflict area would be allowed to return, that the mandate of the Rus-
sian peacekeeping forces would be extended to only the next six 
months, and that the future status of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
was to be based on the decisions of the UN and the OSCE.  
 
The relative success of these indirect talks may well have been due to 
the fact that the parties involved followed what has been termed ‘the 
seven steps of principled negotiations’ (Fisher and Ury 1991). 
 
1. They managed to identify key interests. What was at stake at 
that point was Georgia’s territorial integrity and survival as an 
independent nation; for Russia the key interest was to retain 
control in its strategic backyard and to prevent direct involve-
ment of other great powers. The Russian interests correspond-
ed mostly with those Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as they 
sought the development of their statehood and protection 
against what they saw as the serious threat of Georgian inter-
vention, so they accepted the conditions as well.  
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2. Relationships. Although there was no personal trust between 
Saakashvili and Putin/Medvedev, the people involved in this 
indirect dialogue could act as intermediaries between the war-
ring parties. Sarkozy managed to bridge that personal gap in a 
strained situation when the stakes – the survival of the re-
gime/state – became high enough for Georgia, and the cost for 
Russia – strained relations with its most important economic 
partner, the EU – of continuing military operations in Georgia 
proved higher than the possible strategic gains.  
 
3. Alternatives. When the agreement was reached, Georgia’s 
reservation point was pushed so hard that it found itself forced 
to accept the conditions proposed by the French negotiators 
and accepted by Moscow. For Georgia the desired solution to 
the conflict would be to regain control over Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and repeal the Russian intervention, but after de-
feat on the battlefield Georgia was forced to ‘shift’ its reserva-
tion point and accept the harsh conditions, as the alternative 
would have been the utter collapse of the Georgian state. At 
the same time Russia appeared satisfied with the solution 
achieved in 2008, even though the Saakashvili regime had not 
been removed from power. When faced with a concerted effort 
on the part of the EU, supported indirectly by the USA, Russia 
too decided to ‘shift’ its reservation point, widening the zone 
of possible agreement with the West. Those two acts, the less-
than-voluntary moving of the two countries’ reservation 
points, were what made possible the agreement on cessation of 
hostilities. 
 
4. Identifying options. In the wake of the five-day war, the situa-
tion in the region could be best described as a stalemate. Geor-
gia could not find a mutually acceptable solution, and Russia 
was not interested in finding one. Another important element 
facilitating a negotiated settlement in the wake of the war was 
also the fact that Russia was aware that this local conflict 
could have global implications, and might develop into a new 
conflict between Russia and the West. There are, however, 
some signs that after a period of high tension in bilateral Geor-
gia–Russia relations, both parties – and especially Georgia, the 
weaker party – were more ready to adopt a more pragmatic 
approach. This has probably much to do with the realization 
that what until 2008 had been described as a frozen conflict 
became an ‘intractable conflict’ that could be solved only by 
non-military means. Having in mind the strategic disparity be-
tween Georgia and Russia (Kolstø and Rusetskii 2012), the 
bloody lesson Russia taught Georgia in 2008 and the West’s 
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unwillingness to become engaged more deeply in finding a so-
lution to that intricate conflict, Georgia seems to have been left 
with practically no other option than unwilling acceptance of 
the post-conflict status quo.  
 
5. Criteria/legitimacy. Three different core and apparently ir-
reconcilable interests seemed to be at stake and in conflict in 
this case. For Georgia the question of national survival, territo-
rial integrity and inviolability of the country’s borders was 
central at the outbreak of war, but after five days the question 
had boiled down to the physical survival of the nation. Georgia 
then had no option but to accept the conditions of the proposed 
ceasefire. The agreement reached in 2008 is in Georgia viewed 
as one reached under the conditions of duress and as such lack-
ing legitimacy, but as yet Georgia has had no better options 
available. For Abkhazia and South Ossetia the central issue 
was the right of self-determination and national survival which 
had been de facto – and after Russia’s recognition de iure – 
granted in the aftermath of the war. For Russia the key ques-
tion was the preservation of its status as a great regional and 
global power, a power that does not accept other powers’ di-
rect or indirect presence in what Moscow sees as the country’s 
strategic backyard – or, as President Medvedev put it in a TV 
interview on 31 August 2008, in Russia’s zone of ‘privileged 
interests’. Russia claimed to have legitimate goals – protection 
of its citizens, prevention of genocide – in the conflict. Once 
these goals had been achieved, Moscow was willing to accept 
the conditions proposed by the EU. 
 
6. Commitments. All parties directly involved in the conflict de-
cided to accept the commitments proposed by the French ne-
gotiators. Georgia, which suffered military defeat and could 
not count on external support, had no other option but to ac-
cept. Russia decided to accept the set of commitments because 
it had already achieved most of its strategic and local objec-
tives, and the cost of confrontation with the West that would 
follow had Russia continued its march towards Tbilisi would 
have been prohibitive in political and perhaps also military 
terms. The two breakaway regions followed the Russian ad-
vice, probably realizing that Russia was about to recognize 
their independence and provide them with security guarantees 
against future Georgian attacks.    
 
7. Communications. Direct communications between the war-
ring parties were effectively breached on the day the Georgian 
president decided to send troops to retake Tskhinvali on 7 Au-
38  Pernille Rieker and Ole Jacob Sending (eds) 
gust; or when Yakobashvili was not able to meet the Russian 
representative Popov earlier on 7 August (Ruchkin 2008; 
Yakobashvili 2009). What made direct communication be-
tween Moscow and Tbilisi even more difficult was the fact that 
both Georgia and Russia launched information/propaganda 
campaigns before, during and after the war in August 2008. 
The Moscow line was that Russia prevented the genocide of 
the South Ossetian people that the Georgian regime was at-
tempting to commit. The Georgian line was that a small demo-
cratic nation, the ‘beacon of liberty’ in the post-Soviet space, 
was attacked by a great power with imperial designs: Russia 
was attempting to rid the Caucasus of Western influences, us-
ing the pretext of protecting its citizens (who in legal terms 
were citizens of Georgia) to realize its imperial project and ex-
tend the Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. 
Saakashvili was presented in Russian propaganda as a lunatic 
eating his own tie, as a criminal who deserved to be brought 
before the ICC for his role in preparing the genocide of the 
South Ossetian people and in launching the assault on Tskhin-
vali in which several Russian peacekeepers were also killed. 
From the Georgian side, Putin was portrayed as a typical Rus-
sian wrongdoer and advocate of the rebirth of Imperial Russia 
at the expense of the smaller post-Soviet nations, including 
Georgia, which was crushed by his war machine. Such a point 
of departure made it indeed challenging to get the two leaders 
to talk – even indirectly – one with another. The success of ne-
gotiations was secured by a clear communications strategy on 
the part of the negotiating team, who made it clear to both par-
ties that the alternative to a negotiated settlement would be the 
total annihilation of the Georgian state and the effective break-
down of relations between Russia and the West – as already 
signalled by NATO, which had decided to withdraw from co-
operation with Russia, in a move echoing the Russian reaction 
to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. It was especially 
Sarkozy’s persuasive skills and his determination to get the 
parties to understand that they had no better alternative that 
made this work.  
The role of dialogue in this period/ Preliminary conclusions  
The fact that both parties negotiated with the French team representing 
the EU was an important element that facilitated the relative success 
of negotiations. Moscow could ‘sell’ this as being in line with the 
Russian idea of the European concert of powers as being able to solve 
regional problems among themselves, without US interference. For 
Saakashvili, who feared that he could be left alone to face Russia, the 
EU involvement in finding a negotiated solution was also a way out of 
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the deadlock caused by his ‘tunnel vision’, his apparent lack of strate-
gic intelligence and probably unrealistic expectations as to the role the 
West could play in the conflict. 
 
The agreement reached on 12 August was not a perfect solution, as it 
did not solve the core issues that had been at stake prior to the out-
break of open hostilities. It was, however, probably the best option 
available at the time and under the circumstances. The conflict be-
tween Russia and Georgia over the breakaway regions may still be 
classified as intractable, but the dialogue initiated by the EU succeed-
ed in putting an end to the bloody phase of that conflict. Perhaps it 
may help the parties to realize at some stage that the cost of resorting 
to arms could be higher than the possible gains.  
Concluding remarks 
This brief study has sought answers to a set of questions on the use-
fulness of dialogue in conflict prevention and settlement. We have 
looked into the role of dialogue in the Russian–Georgian conflict, 
probing into what made the dialogue successful or not,  the character 
of the dialogue between the actors prior to, during and after the peak 
of the crisis in August 2008, and, finally, whether we could identify 
‘tipping points’ beyond which dialogue was of little relevance. 
 
The main finding is that, with the conflict between Georgia and Russia 
threatening to escalate, dialogue seemed a non-viable option: the stra-
tegic and interest distance between the parties had grown so much that 
calls for dialogue had no chance of reaching the ears of those in 
charge. In addition there was an evident lack of mutual trust, indeed a 
sense of hostility, between Georgian and Russian leaders, combined 
with a lack of commitment on the part of the international community 
to prevent the conflict from escalating. On top of all that came a series 
of misjudgements and miscalculations that triggered the outbreak of 
open hostilities.  
 
The immediate tipping point beyond which dialogue was no longer 
possible was the Georgian troops’ shelling of Tskhinvali that caused 
massive human casualties (according to the Russian reading), or (ac-
cording to the Georgian reading) Russian violation of Georgian sover-
eignty and territorial integrity caused by Russia moving its troops 
through the Roki Tunnel. The shelling of Tskhinvali provided Russia 
with a pretext for intervention that resulted in Georgian military defeat 
and the apparent undermining of the credibility of the West as a pro-
vider of security in the post-Soviet space. What the Georgians saw as 
Russian violation of Georgian sovereignty left Saakashvili with no 
other option but to fight. At that point, dialogue was not an option that 
any of the parties involved was willing to consider. For dialogue to 
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become relevant again, the situation on the ground had to change – 
and the involvement of new actors was apparently needed to make the 
warring parties silence their guns.  
 
Due largely to the disparity of the military potentials available and en-
gaged in this military phase of the conflict, the situation changed dra-
matically within few days. This led other actors (the EU, the OSCE, 
the USA,) who realized the gravity of the situation, to become in-
volved in attempts at finding a negotiated solution. With the involve-
ment of these new actors, the strategic calculus of the parties directly 
involved in the conflict changed. Dialogue proved again to be a rele-
vant option as a way out of the war deadlock. After several rounds of 
negotiations, an agreement on immediate ceasefire was reached on 12 
August 2008.  
 
The negotiations brought the end to the armed phase of the conflict, 
but the contentious issues that led to war have not been resolved. Re-
lations between Russia and Georgia have remained tense and seem 
unlikely to improve soon, not least since the key adversaries – Saa-
kashvili, Putin/Medvedev – are still in charge of the policies of their 
countries. However, one independent observer has shown some opti-
mism by referring to the German–French and Russian–Finnish recon-
ciliations as examples to be followed by Russia and Georgia. Further, 
according to the same source, reintegration of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia into the Georgian state – probably the main objective of the 
war on the Georgian side – is unlikely in the foreseeable future, due to 
the recent war and Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions. On 
the other hand, the 2008 war has shown that these conflicts do not 
have a military solution: the only way to enable Georgians, Abkhazi-
ans and South Ossetians to live together lies in lengthy negotiations 
and patient dialogue (RAD 2008). Most of those who have learnt the 
painful lesson of the five-day war would agree that even tortuous and 
difficult dialogue with no guarantee of success is far better an option 
than a new and not necessarily victorious war. 
 
The Libya conflict(s) and the role of 
multicultural dialogue 
Pernille Rieker (NUPI) and Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer (IFS) 
Introduction 
This case study investigates the role of inter-cultural dialogue in crisis 
resolution between Libya and Western states between the mid-1990s 
and the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Following the negotiated aban-
donment of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme in late 2003, the 
North African state transitioned from international pariah toward a 
normalized status in the international community. Within a decade of 
these breakthroughs, the Libyan regime crumbled following a NATO-
led campaign in support of the anti-regime forces. These tumultuous 
developments give rise to questions about the possibilities for dia-
logue – and negotiated reform – with a radical and isolated regime. 
What role did dialogue between the West and Libya play in this peri-
od? What accounts for the substantial results of earlier negotiations, 
and why did dialogue apparently fail in the end?   
 
We will examine these shifts, focusing primarily on the period be-
tween 1995 and 2011. During these years a series of secret talks and 
negotiations unfolded between the West and Libya. We will look into 
the impact of domestic structural changes, international shocks such as 
the US-led War on Terror, and the roles of force and diplomacy in 
transforming Libya’s policies and behaviour during this period.   
Background: From isolation toward rapprochement 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power after a military coup in 
1969. The Gaddafi regime adopted an anti-colonial and increasingly 
radical foreign policy. Libya offered support for anti-colonial move-
ments that employed terrorist and guerrilla tactics, providing financial 
support and training facilities. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi’s 
increasingly idiosyncratic and radical ideology created frictions do-
mestically and at the international level as well. By the early 1990s the 
Gaddafi regime found itself isolated, subject to US sanctions, and ridi-
culed internationally.  
 
These activities caused increasing strains in Libya’s relations with 
states in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Gaddafi’s 
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radical ideology began to trigger growing discontent at home and 
abroad during the 1980s. His Revolutionary Committees gained grow-
ing influence, also over foreign policy, as they replaced the profes-
sional Libyan diplomatic corps. This shift led to controversial practic-
es, like the declared policy of eliminating opposition figures residing 
abroad, through agents based in Libyan embassies.  
 
During the 1980s, Libya’s radical policies led to clashes with Western 
states as well as regional powers. In 1981,  US jets shot down two 
Libyan planes in the Gulf of Sidra. Two years earlier, attacks on the  
US embassy in the Libyan capital Tripoli had led to the closure of the 
embassy. Over the next few years, US President Reagan characterized 
Gaddafi as the ‘Mad Dog’ of the Middle East, and defined Libyan re-
gime change as a policy objective. In 1984, the shooting of a British 
police officer outside the Libyan embassy in London caused the break 
of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
 
During the 1980s, Libyan agents were involved in a series of attacks 
on foreign soil targeting Western individuals. The attack on the La 
Belle discothèque in Berlin, the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 
over Lockerbie, and the bombing of a French plane UTA 772 over 
Niger in 1989 caused hundreds of casualties. As a consequence, Libya 
was subjected to bombing raids in 1986 on Tripoli and Benghazi. Fur-
thermore, US economic sanctions targeted Libya’s key export – oil.  
Coming in from the cold? 
The 1990s brought tremendous international pressure and heightened 
domestic discontent, with several direct challenges to Gaddafi’s lead-
ership (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). In 1991, two Libyan agents were 
accused of responsibility for the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am 103 
flight. Libya refused to extradite the two suspects, which led to the 
imposition of international economic sanctions through UN Security 
Council Resolution 748 (1992). These sanctions, combined with the 
sanctions targeting Libya’s oil industry, contributed to erode the al-
ready struggling Libyan economy. During the early 1990s, domestic 
dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and the excesses of the 
Revolutionary Committees created a crisis. Assassination attempts and 
crumbling support of key tribes posed a serious home-grown chal-
lenge to the regime’s long-term survival. In the middle of the decade, 
the regime faced its greatest challenge: an Islamist uprising in Ben-
ghazi that lasted from 1995 to 1998, and highlighted Islamist elements 
as a key challenge to the survival of the Gaddafi regime. 
 
By the early 1990s the Gaddafi regime had come increasingly disillu-
sioned with its radical policy experiments. Following mounting do-
mestic discontent and strained foreign relations, Gaddafi and his clos-
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est advisors concluded that it would be necessary to adopt a more con-
ciliatory route in order to secure their long-term survival. To improve 
the domestic economy, and thus maintain the rentier state practices 
shoring up domestic support for the Gaddafi regime, tackling the in-
ternational sanctions became their first priority. 
Sanctions and engagement 
Faced with both international and domestic pressure, reformist ele-
ments in the Libyan regime persuaded Gaddafi of the need to improve 
the country’s international standing. Libyan officials reportedly 
reached out to US officials as early as 1992, offering to strike a deal 
on Lockerbie, but this initiative was rebuffed (Jentleson and Whytock 
2005/06; St John 2004). When such efforts failed, Libya sought to 
find ways to get the sanctions regime lifted or at least ameliorated, 
through a series of diplomatic overtures to Western powers.  
 
The Gaddafi regime began to call into question the legitimacy of the 
sanctions regime to erode international support for these measures. 
Throughout this period, the Gaddafi regime sought to utilize – and 
perhaps manipulate – liberal institutionalist symbols and multilateral 
institutions. Applying a normative discourse, Gaddafi argued that the 
sanctions regime actually violated the norms of procedural justice rec-
ognized in international law and the domestic legal systems of most 
states; that supporting the sanctions constituted disrespect for accepted 
International Organisations and the wishes of the international com-
munity rather than respect for them; and finally that such disrespect 
was itself a threat to international peace and security (Hurd 2005: : 
504). Through such arguments, Libya managed to secure support from 
several countries, and representatives from the West – in particular the 
US and UK – found themselves having to discuss and defend the legit-
imacy of the sanctions. Noticeably absent for most the 1990s, howev-
er, was support from Middle Eastern states. Disappointed, Gaddafi 
increasingly turned his attention toward Africa.  
 ‘The Libyan model’: negotiated reform through secret talks  
Two important turning points emerged in Libya’s relations with the 
international community between the mid-1990s and 2003. The first 
was the Lockerbie negotiations concerning the hand-over of the two 
suspects, for trial in The Hague. The second was the secret trilateral 
negotiations to end Libya’s longstanding efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.   
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Lockerbie talks  
In 1999, Libya decided to hand over the two suspects of the Lockerbie 
attack for trial in The Hague in return for the suspension of UN sanc-
tions (Jentleson and Whytock 2005/06). This decision followed exten-
sive negotiations dating back to 1995. These talks took the form of 
discrete and intimate deliberations with clearly defined quid-pro-quo 
steps.  
 
As the UN sanctions and the  US oil embargo began to take their toll 
on the Libyan economy, Gaddafi made the improvement of the coun-
try’s economic situation a key priority. However, this sense of urgen-
cy was not matched by the international community. For example, ini-
tially the Clinton administration did not take the Libyan approaches 
seriously. In 1995, however, they agreed to talks after a Republican, 
Abraham Sofaer, reportedly passed a message from the Libyan regime 
to the Clinton administration. From 1995, several high level meetings 
were held in a hotel in Geneva. These negotiations were difficult ini-
tially, mainly due to a combination of lack of trust and commitment 
by the USA. This lack of urgency reflected the fact that Libya was 
seen as posing any imminent security challenges. 
 
The Libyan regime also approached  US and European oil companies 
that had been in Libya before the oil embargo, to generate additional 
support for their efforts to get the sanctions regime lifted. When Euro-
pean oil companies began making visits to Libya, US oil companies 
started to put pressure on Washington. Tony Blair, the new British 
Prime Minister, also tried to persuade Clinton to approach Gaddafi in 
order to find a solution. The USA finally decided to go along with 
this, recognizing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to main-
tain the sanction regime. In 1998, Washington therefore accepted a 
special negotiation solution: Gaddafi would hand over the two sus-
pects of the Lockerbie terrorist act to a court in the Netherlands, to be 
judged under  US rules and by British judges. In addition, the Libyan 
regime provided compensation to each of the victims’ families. Fol-
lowing the trial the UN sanctions were lifted, but not the unilateral US 
sanctions (Vitkine 2011). 
  
During the late 1990s, reformist elements – favouring economic re-
form and improved relations with Western states – came to influence 
Libya’s foreign relations and policies in an increasingly moderate di-
rection. The Clinton administration seized this opportunity to initiate a 
new round of negotiations. This time the aim was to open a sub-set of 
issues linked to the Middle East Peace Process, in which President 
Clinton was heavily involved at the time, as part of the dialogue with 
Libya. The US administration attempted to persuade the Libyan leader 
to end his support for Palestinian organizations, offering the lifting of 
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sanctions as an incentive for closer relations. In the following days, 
the Abu Nidal camp in Libya was closed down.  
9/11, secret talks and Libya’s nuclear turnaround  
After George W. Bush assumed the US presidency in January 2001, 
the Gaddafi regime intensified its efforts to improve bilateral relations. 
The Bush administration’s preoccupation with the threat from so-
called ‘rogue states’ left the Libyan regime feeling increasingly vul-
nerable. This sense of urgency to resolve Libya’s conflict with the 
United States intensified after the terrorist attack of 9/11 that year, and 
the Gaddafi regime now sought to rebrand itself as a potential partner 
in the US-led War on Terror. Libya offered to share intelligence in-
formation with the United States. This offer was not solely an oppor-
tunistic move on the part of the Libyans, as the Gaddafi regime also 
saw radical Islamist terrorism in Libya as a key threat to its survival.  
Here we may recall that Libya was not mentioned in Georges Bush’s 
State of the Union address in 2002, where he focused on rogue states 
like Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’.4  
 
The ensuing war on terror – and growing pressure on Iraq, citing alle-
gations about residual WMD (weapons of mass destruction) threats – 
intensified the Gaddafi regime’s desire to resolve the remaining issues 
that stood in the way of fully normalized relations with the USA. 
Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, who was a PhD student at LSE in Lon-
don, contacted officials at the British Secret Intelligence Service MI-6, 
and passed on the message that his father was ready to consider aban-
doning Libya’s WMD programmes. This offer came as a surprise to 
the US administration, which at the time was preoccupied with Iraq. 
However, they accepted. The sensitivity of these negotiations required 
strict secrecy and compartmentalization on all sides (Tucker 2009: : 
364). 
 
Between March and September 2003  US, British, and Libyan offi-
cials held a series of secret meetings in London, Geneva and Tripoli. 
While the Libyans were forthcoming, and had repeatedly stated their 
preparedness to abandon the pursuit of WMD, a key concern was that 
Gaddafi would not verifiably give up the entire programme. A turning 
point came on 3 October, when the USA, Britain, German and Italy 
arranged the diversion at sea of a German-owned container ship, the 
BBC China, en route from Dubai to Libya. Containers on board were 
found to hold thousands of parts for centrifuges used to enrich urani-
um. Subsequently, the Libyan side invited inspectors from the USA 
                                                 
4  ‘Axis of evil’ is a term initially used by George W. Bush in his State of the Union Ad-
dress on 29 January 2002, and often repeated throughout his presidency, describing gov-
ernments that he accused of helping terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction. 
Bush labelled Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’. 
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and Britain to visit the sites associated with its WMD programmes and 
collect the sensitive nuclear technology intended for the weapons pro-
gramme. On 19 December, the Libyan regime announced publicly its 
decision to abandon the pursuit of WMD and their means of delivery. 
The announcement came only a few days after Saddam Hussein had 
been captured and killed in Iraq.   
 
In this process, the Libyan regime appeared to be a flexible and com-
mitted negotiating partner, offering a much-needed public diplomatic 
success for US President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war debacle. In fact, this outcome has 
been cited as an example of a successful Western soft-power initiative 
in the War on Terror and has also been interpreted as the most suc-
cessful case of coercive diplomacy since the Cuban missile crisis 
without the threat of force (Jentleson and Whytock 2005/06).  
 
The negotiations that led to Libya’s WMD disarmament benefitted 
from the experiences and trust that had been established during the 
Lockerbie negotiations. Some of the US and British counterparts later 
expressed surprise at how quickly the Libyan side had acted to facili-
tate inspection visits and the removal of the centrifuge technology. 
Once the Libyan dictator had made a strategic decision, and commit-
ted to it, the notoriously inefficient state apparatus was able to imple-
ment this decision within days. There is a strong contrast between this 
and the Iraqi state’s difficulties in implementing Saddam Hussein’s 
new policy of increased collaboration with UN inspectors in late 2002 
(Braut-Hegghammer 2008). 
 
Following the 2003 announcement of Libya’s negotiated nuclear vol-
te-face, this deal was cited as a model that could be applied in getting 
other isolated states to move toward normalized relations with the in-
ternational community. Libyan leaders and their counterparts in Eu-
rope and the United States held up this ‘Libyan model’ – negotiated 
normalization – as a fruitful approach to other states. 
The role of dialogue in this period  
As we have seen, a combination of domestic and external factors con-
tributed to facilitate dialogue during this period. At the domestic level, 
mounting challenges following popular dissatisfaction combined with 
the emergence of an intensified external threat to the regime after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and the announcement of the Bush doctrine. Ini-
tially, during the 1990s, there had been no perceived urgency on the 
side of the West to open negotiations. The Libyans had to work hard, 
and through different channels, to convince Washington that it was 
also in the US interest to negotiate. The lack of trust (especially on the 
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side of the West) was a challenge, but through skilful secret negotia-
tions, this challenge was overcome – at least temporarily.  
 
There are various interpretations of Gaddafi’s decision to facilitate the 
Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands. Some argue that this is a successful 
case of multilateral sanctions against Libya in the 1990s, others see it 
as part of a broader shift within the Gaddafi regime towards Realpoli-
tik and a desire to improve Libya’s international standing (Blakely 
2010; Braut-Hegghammer 2008). The 2003 negotiations that ended 
with the Libyan nuclear turn-round were also caused by a combination 
of these two factors, but were additionally influenced by key events 
like the war on international terrorism. Both series of negotiations are 
pertinent examples of successful inter-cultural negotiations where one 
of the parties had many characteristics in common with what Robert 
Mnookin would refer to as ‘the devil’ (in his 2011 book Bargaining 
with the Devil: When to Fight, When to Negotiate).  
 
In this case, both sides chose to negotiate. The question is then, what 
type of dialogue/negotiation is the most representative of this period?  
 
In this dialogue or series of negotiations, there was a focus on a win–
win solution through a process that must be seen to be quite similar to 
what the introduction was referred to as the ‘integrative approach’. 
This win–win solution was achieved after a series of secret negotia-
tions where the negotiators were quite good at identifying interests – 
the first step of the integrative approach. Second, the negotiators on 
both sides also managed to separate the people from the problem, and 
tried to build trust between the parties through diplomacy and personal 
relationship. In the 2003 negotiations, they could also build on the 
trust that had been developed in the late 1990s, since the negotiations 
involved the same people. Third, it is difficult to know for certain 
whether or not both parties had a clear conception of their best alterna-
tive negotiated agreement – BATNA – and whether they identified 
different options, but due to the length of the negotiations (steps 3 and 
4), they probably did so during and between these different series of 
talks. Finally, what ultimately made these negotiations with Libya a 
success was that both parties could agree on mutually acceptable crite-
ria and that all parties (in the end at least) respected the commitments 
made (steps 5 and 6). The final condition (or step) is good communi-
cation skills – which obviously seems to have been the case here.  
 
This means that this negotiation period that started after Gaddafi’s ini-
tiative in the mid-1990s and ended with the nuclear turnaround in 
2003 must be seen as a clear example of integrative inter-cultural ne-
gotiation. However, it is also important to note that without the exter-
nal and internal factors that favoured dialogue, the result might have 
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been different. The need to restore the Libyan economy and to fight 
regime-threatening terrorism are important factors in explaining Gad-
dafi’s willingness to negotiate in this period. 
After the ‘Libyan Model’: Disappointments, crises and new 
negotiations 
Within a year, the Libyan leader began to express disappointment at 
what had been achieved through the 2003 deal. In December 2004, 
Gaddafi stated:  
 
Actually we were somewhat disappointed by the response from Europe, the 
United States, and Japan. They did not really repay Libya for its contribution to 
international peace. And we are still waiting. If we are not repaid, other countries 
will not follow our example and dismantle their programmes in turn. When we 
spoke with North Korea and Iran, which are suspected of having nuclear pro-
grammes, they said: ‘But what was the recompense in your case? What did you 
obtain from the international community? So why do you want us to dismantle 
our programme?’5 
  
This disappointment reflected the lengthy Congressional process of 
lifting all US sanctions, and resentment that Libya had been promised 
further concessions and benefits that were not forthcoming. Over the 
following years, Libyan officials grew increasingly frustrated that 
their country had not become a more respected member of the interna-
tional community, and was excluded from events such as the 2010 nu-
clear security summit in the United States. Gaddafi criticized this de-
cision, pointing out that this would make the Libyan model less attrac-
tive to states like North Korea and Iran.6  
 
In addition, the Libyan regime moved away from the ‘post-
revolutionary’ emphasis on rapprochement toward a more hard-line 
position. The officials who had been personally involved in negotiat-
ing agreements with the USA and the UK found themselves out-
weighed by more hard-line regime elements. The Libyan regime faced 
a tricky balancing act during this period, unable to agree on a way 
forward to revitalize the economy and strengthen the regime’s domes-
tic standing.  
 
We should note in particular three turning points or crises in the rela-
tionship between Libya and the West: (1) the crisis linked to the Bul-
garian nurses; (2) the return of hard-liners and more anti-Western offi-
cials in the Libyan administration; (3) the cartoon crisis. A particularly 
challenging aspect of the crises facing the regime between 2003 and 
                                                 
5  ‘Libyan leader laments no “concrete” reward for giving up WMD’, Rome RAI Television 
Network (in Italian), 17 December 2004, Lexis-Nexis. 
6  Matthew Lee, ‘Gadhafi: US nuclear snub of Libya hurts peace’, Associated Press, 26 
April 2010. 
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2011 was that they entailed domestic ramifications – in the form of 
clashes between civilians and security forces, grieving families, and 
the Libyan economy. As the regime sought to cope with these crises, 
the need for domestic legitimacy seemed to come increasingly into 
conflict with the objectives of strengthening the country’s internation-
al standing.  
The Bulgarian nurses  
Following the 2003 diplomatic breakthrough, Libya entered into a 
new round of negotiations with the West in 2007. These negotiations 
concerned five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor who had 
been charged with deliberately infecting 426 children with HIV in 
1998 at the El-Fatih hospital in Benghazi. These six individuals re-
ceived a death sentence that was upheld in Libya’s highest court in 
2007. As the evidence strongly suggested the infections were caused 
by general malpractice, and not intentional acts on the part of the ac-
cused, the international community strongly condemned both the rul-
ing and the use of torture to extract confessions from the defendants. 
The epidemic triggered strong emotions in Libya, consistent with the 
scale of the outbreak (the largest hospital-induced HIV epidemic to 
date, according to some observers). While initial Libyan reports cited 
the poor sanitary conditions at the hospital, the Bulgarian nurses and 
Palestinian doctor were soon identified as the main suspects of an al-
leged conspiracy involving the CIA and Mossad. The fact that this 
took place in Eastern Libya, an area with a long history of resistance 
to the Gaddafi regime, may have bolstered the regime’s desire to seek 
a negotiated solution without losing face in Libyan public opinion. 
 
The European Union entered into negotiations with the Libyan regime 
to find a solution to this crisis. Gaddafi was adamant that the court 
system in Libya was independent from political pressure, and empha-
sized that the judicial system could not be overruled. A key issue de-
laying a negotiated settlement, however, was disagreement within the 
Libyan regime concerning the type of agreement that could lay the 
foundation for a negotiated solution. Hard-liners insisted on financial 
compensation to the 426 families, and proposed an exchange of the 
medical personnel in return for the Libyan national convicted of the 
Lockerbie attack, who was imprisoned in Scotland. Moderates, led by 
Seif al-Islam Gaddafi and senior diplomat Abdellati al-Obeidi, were 
prepared to admit to Libyan responsibility for the HIV epidemic. They 
took a more conciliatory approach, which ultimately found favour 
with Gaddafi.7 In these negotiations, the Libyan regime insisted on 
reaching an agreement that would include financial compensation – 
                                                 
7  ‘Quiet Pressure from Berlin: How EU and German Diplomacy Helped Save Bulgarian 
Nurses’, Der Spiegel Online International, 23.07.2007. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,495974,00.html  
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such as Libya’s compensation to the Lockerbie families – and not 
overturning the guilty verdict imposed by the Libyan justice system.  
 
Following lengthy negotiations, in 2007 a deal was struck between 
Libya and the EU. The Libyan High Judicial Council overturned the 
death sentences, and an extradition to Bulgaria was negotiated. In July 
2007, Libya announced that a settlement had been reached including 
the establishment of a fund of €9.5 million to improve conditions at 
the hospital in Benghazi where the HIV epidemic had broken out.8 
France played a key role in late stage of these deliberations. Shortly 
after the six were released, it emerged that President Nicolas Sarkozy 
had offered the prospect of an arms trade agreement and opened for 
potential civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries.  
 
The Libyans wanted the establishment of a fund to aid the families of 
the 425 children, and asked USD 1 million per child. Bulgaria provid-
ed the first USD 44 million in debt relief, the Libyan government con-
tributed USD 74 million, while the EU promised only the €9.5 million 
to the Benghazi hospital.9 The Libyan government had to cover the 
outstanding amount. As a result, Gaddafi could claim that the EU 
would compensate the victims, whereas the European counterparts 
could point to the sizeable Libyan portion, to refute allegations that 
this was a reparations fund.  
 
Resolution of this conflict cleared the way for further cooperation be-
tween Libya and the European Union. This was clearly beneficial to 
both sides, due to Libya’s geostrategic location and role as oil exporter 
to major European countries. The settlement also demonstrated that 
Libya had learned from prior experiences, and sought to emulate a 
more quid-pro-quo, incremental approach including tangible benefits 
and avoiding interference with key domestic institutions like the judi-
ciary.  
Domestic transition: Back to the future  
Following the 2003 agreement, observers anticipated liberalization of 
Libya’s economy to reap the benefits of enhanced trade and coopera-
tion. In fact, the regime appeared to be moving in the opposite direc-
tion. Despite efforts to recruit leading British and  US scholars to ad-
vise the Gaddafi regime on economic reform, and offers of Libyan 
funding to leading US universities to improve the regime’s image, 
substantial reform remained elusive. During this period, the Libyan 
                                                 
8  ‘Libya commutes medics’ sentences’, Reuters (CNN), 07.07.2007. 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/07/17/libya.medics.reut/index.html. Retrieved 
17.07. 2007. 
9  ‘French Posturing over Bulgarian Nurses: Why Did Cecilia Sarkozy Go to Tripoli?’, 
Spiegel Online International, 07/24/2007 24.07.2007. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,496269,00.html 
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leadership seemed incapable of identifying a path that could reconcile 
reform with securing and maintaining the regime’s sources of eco-
nomic and political power. While the Libyan regime recognized the 
need to revise former revolutionary dictums, substantial revisions to 
the relationship between the regime and civil society were still out of 
the question.  
 
Reform remained elusive for two key reasons. First, the Gaddafi re-
gime was reluctant to undertake any reforms that could weaken its 
domestic power base. As Libya had been a rentier state for decades, 
genuine economic liberalization could challenge an important source 
of leverage. Second, regime figures who had spearheaded the move 
toward negotiations and rapprochement had been replaced with more 
conservative officials who were against domestic liberalization and 
closer ties with the West. Individuals who were associated with the 
reformist wing remained influential, but were outweighed by the hard-
liners who opposed further reform. 
Cartoon crisis  
The Libyan balancing act proved fragile. The regime continued to be 
concerned about its weak domestic political standing, seemingly up-
held mainly by the lack of feasible alternatives, while remaining un-
willing – or unable – to bring about reform. In early 2006, the eastern 
city of Benghazi was shaken by protests following the publication of 
cartoons in Denmark and Norway depicting the Prophet Muhammad. 
The protests followed the appearance of an Italian minister, Roberto 
Calderoli, wearing a t-shirt on television with an offensive depiction 
of the Prophet on 15 February. A protest in Benghazi led to an attack 
on the Italian consulate: eleven protesters were killed by security forc-
es and dozens were injured. The subsequent reaction of the regime – 
reportedly offering the victims burial as martyrs – reflected concerns 
that such demonstrations could also bring about intensified criticism 
of domestic issues. In stark contrast to Syrian attacks on Norwegian 
and Danish embassies, the regime opted to repress the demonstration 
on this occasion, apparently valuing its relationship with Western al-
lies over frustrations expressed by its people.     
Role of dialogue in this period? 
The 2003 agreement and recognition of Gaddafi as a partner in the 
war against terrorism led to Libya’s reintegration into the international 
community. After 2003, however, it became clear that this integration 
had its limits. Libyan disillusionment, and lessons learned from tough 
negotiations with Western counterparts, informed the objectives and 
tactics of subsequent dialogues and interactions. During the two key 
crises following the 2003 ‘Libyan model’, the behaviour of the Gad-
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dafi regime was evidently influenced by concerns about their domestic 
standing. This indicates that domestic factors and domestic support are 
important even in an authoritarian state such as Gaddafi’s Libya. 
Emotions, and in this case humiliation, as referred to in Geopolitics of 
emotions (Moïsi 2009) might well have influenced the character of the 
negotiations between the West and Libya in this period. As we have 
seen, the negotiations on the issue of the Bulgarian nurses were still 
geared towards a win–win solution. Meanwhile, Gaddafi was more 
reluctant to back down, due to concerns about his domestic standing. 
He also preferred the institutionalized dimension of the legal appa-
ratus, to distance himself from the deal in an issue so sensitive in do-
mestic public opinion. There was also a domestic struggle over the 
direction of negotiations – a more bargaining position (the hard-liners) 
or more conciliatory (the moderates, including Gaddafi’s son Saif Al-
Islam). 
  
While these negotiations ended successfully, and in this sense may 
also be an example of integrative approach, they did not lead to im-
proved relations between the West and Libya. These were tense, with 
the level of trust rather low on both sides. However, both parties man-
aged to identify their interests (step 1), separate the people from the 
problem (at least temporarily), and France and the EU managed to 
achieve results after skilful diplomatic efforts (steps 1and 2). Also 
here it is difficult to say whether both parties knew their Best Alterna-
tive Negotiated Agreement (step 3), but they identified options, and 
creative thinking at least on the side of the French led to results (step 
4). Both parties also agreed on mutual acceptable criteria; they were 
committed and had good communication skills (steps 5, 6 and 7).  
 
But while this particular negotiation situation may be seen as an ex-
ample of the integrative approach, the fact that during the same period 
the regime moved in a more conservative direction was a clear indica-
tion that this dialogue would not necessarily mean enhance regional 
stability and international security. The negotiations concerning the 
Bulgarian nurses and the cartoon crisis demonstrated the difficult bal-
ancing act of seeking to ensure domestic legitimacy, on the one hand, 
and being perceived as a moderate, stable ally of the Western powers, 
on the other.  
 
Like Mnookin, we may also question whether it is possible to expect 
viable negotiated results when negotiating with persons and regimes 
that operate on a completely different normative basis. In the next sec-
tion, focusing on the period initiated with the Arab spring, we will see 
how the West moved away from the negotiations option. 
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Libya and the Arab Spring 
In 2011, the improved relationship between the Gaddafi regime and 
Western allies quickly came to an end. After popular movements 
overturned the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, Libya’s immediate neigh-
bours to the west and the east, Libya was shook by a national revolt 
beginning in February 2011.10 This uprising emerged from a series of 
protests in Benghazi criticizing the Gaddafi regime’s treatment of po-
litical opponents. Although united in the determination to overthrow 
the Gaddafi regime, the opposition was a fragmented collection of lo-
cal militia groups and political associations from across the country. 
The Gaddafi regime responded in a far more brutal and uncompromis-
ing manner than the Egyptian and Tunisian authoritarian regimes had 
done. This response drove a wedge between the Libyan regime and its 
former Western allies. Gaddafi and his regime soon found themselves 
isolated and under mounting international pressure.  
 
Within days, the revolt had spread across the country and loyalist 
forces had lost control of key cities, notably Benghazi. Faced with a 
rapidly spreading revolt, the long-divided Gaddafi regime stood firm 
against the opposition coalition and refused to commit to substantial 
reform or meaningful concessions. Muammar Gaddafi, who at that 
time had ruled Libya for more than 41 years, characterized the protes-
tors as drug-fuelled foreign agents with connections to al-Qaida. His 
son Saif-al-Islam, who had previously distinguished himself as an ap-
parent champion of reform and liberalization, also maintained that the 
regime would firmly strike back the protests until the rebellion had 
been fully stamped out. By late February, a counter-offensive had be-
gun, and government forces succeeded in pushing the opposition forc-
es back to Benghazi. Reports soon emerged of brutal repression of the 
civilian protestors, which further tarnished the Gaddafi regime. 
 
Faced with the violent repression of the protests by Libyan security 
forces and mercenaries, Western leaders voiced support for the oppo-
sition movement and denounced the response of the Gaddafi regime. 
Within weeks, the UK and US leaders declared that the Gaddafi re-
gime was no longer considered a legitimate ruler of Libya. A National 
Transitional Council was established in Benghazi to serve as an oppo-
sition governmental agency. On 10 March 2011, France became the 
first state to officially recognize the Council as the legitimate repre-
sentative of the Libyan people. Gaddafi’s military attacks against the 
revolts were condemned by the UN, several countries imposed eco-
nomic sanctions against Libya and the UN Security Council also voted 
to refer Gaddafi and other government officials to the ICC for investi-
gation (Resolution 1970). The decision to refer Gaddafi to the ICC 
                                                 
10  International Crisis Group ‘Holding Libya together: Security challenges after Qadhafi’, 
Middle East/North Africa Report N°115,  14 December 2011. 
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appears to have been a red line for the Libyan leader, who in previous 
crises had insisted on avoiding personal culpability for acts such as the 
Lockerbie bombing.  
 
Regional actors responded to the Libyan conflict with various prefer-
ences for a negotiated solution versus military intervention to protect 
civilian protestors from Gaddafi’s promised revenge. The African Un-
ion sought to facilitate a negotiated settlement that essentially would 
enable Gaddafi to maintain his position, while also facilitating some 
reform. The Arab League, on the other hand, voiced strong criticism 
of the Gaddafi regime’s harsh response. The support for the Libyan 
opposition movement stood in contrast to the more gradual support 
accorded by Western states to the opposition movements in Tunisia 
and Egypt. In particular, the response of France to the Libyan conflict 
may have been driven by perceptions that it had been too slow in sup-
porting the anti-regime protesters in Tunisia. As key European states, 
notably the UK and France, pressed for action to shield the Libyan 
opposition from the violent response Gaddafi had publicly committed 
to delivering, the USA remained reluctant to signal commitment to 
support the uprising in the form of military intervention.   
 
Despite initial reluctance to support the Libyan opposition movement 
actively, the international community was united in its strong criticism 
of the Gaddafi regime’s harsh response to the protesters. While prin-
ciples of non-intervention and fears of setting a precedent that could 
come to haunt the international community in the case of Syria con-
tributed to this initial restraint, the characteristics of the Libyan regime 
also influenced the outside world’s response. Despite its geostrategic 
importance and oil exports, Libya’s idiosyncratic regime had rendered 
it a marginal actor in international relations and Middle Eastern poli-
tics. Following Gaddafi’s continued interference in other Middle East-
ern states, including alleged support for an assassination plot targeting 
the Saudi Arabian royal family, there was little support to be found 
among these states for the Gaddafi regime. While the opposition 
movement was at best a loose coalition, lacking a political programme 
and internal coordination, the brutal response of the Gaddafi regime 
soon led Middle Eastern and Western states to treat the opposition as 
legitimate representatives of the Libyan people and to seek to curb the 
Gaddafi regime’s campaign to end the protests.   
 
On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, 
sanctioning the establishment of a no-fly zone and the use of ‘all 
means necessary’ to protect civilians in Libya. Subsequently, NATO 
provided aerial protection to shield the opposition forces from the 
government forces. This move was welcomed by key regional actors, 
as evidenced in the Arab League’s call for the imposition of a no-fly 
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zone prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973. This rare instance of 
invited intervention in a Middle Eastern domestic conflict reflected 
the unique context of the recent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, but 
also the deep-felt dislike of the formerly radical Gaddafi regime.  
 
The NATO campaign nullified the military superiority of the Gaddafi 
loyalist forces, and the bombing campaigns targeting the regime’s 
strongholds further weakened their capability to withstand the pres-
sure. This campaign provided the rebels with time and space to make 
gradual advances toward the capital. As the Gaddafi regime was tar-
geted with military and economic sanctions, it was soon clear that the 
regime would eventually crumble. The question was how long it 
would be able to hold out.   
 
In the late spring of 2011, the Gaddafi regime appeared to be beyond 
saving. The violent campaign to defeat the uprising led by former ap-
parently liberal figures such as Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi indicated that 
the regime could not be engaged in a meaningful dialogue or negotia-
tions. As the rebellion continued, moderate elements in the Gaddafi 
regime joined the uprising. Already in late February 2011 the Libyan 
UN ambassador, a former childhood friend of Muammar Gaddafi and 
a fellow revolutionary, had criticized the brutal repression in the coun-
try and called for foreign intervention to curb Gaddafi’s offensive.    
Aiming at a zero-sum victory – no willingness to negotiate 
Attempts made by the African Union to mediate between the two 
sides faltered due to the insistence of the opposition on regime change 
and the refusal of the Gaddafi regime to commit to meaningful 
change. The mutually exclusive objectives of the contenders rendered 
negotiations futile. The lack of trust between the two sides, and their 
pursuit of a zero-sum victory, made any attempt at dialogue or negoti-
ated settlement highly unlikely to succeed. Both sides displayed a lack 
of will to negotiate a solution. The objective of the opposition move-
ment was to topple the Gaddafi regime and instate a democratic form 
of government. As such, the Gaddafi regime was not considered a le-
gitimate actor, so there was little room for negotiation apart from an 
orderly transition to democratic rule. The Gaddafi regime, for its part, 
refused to have direct contact with the opposition movement. Reports 
indicated some attempts by the Gaddafi regime to communicate pro-
posals to the opposition movement to end the conflict. Furthermore, 
the African states seeking to facilitate such a dialogue appeared to en-
joy scant support among Middle Eastern and Western states. With lit-
tle leverage to offer, and with two intransigent parties in a civil war, 
Libya did not offer fertile ground for dialogue or a negotiated solution 
to the conflict.   
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Conclusion  
What role did dialogue play in the conflicts/crisis? 
As noted in the introduction to this report, there are different types of 
dialogues or forms of negotiations. The negotiation literature distin-
guishes between structural, strategic, behavioural, concession ex-
change and integrative dialogues. 
 
However, only integrative dialogue has a win–win potential. This 
form of dialogue is characterized by its focus on negotiation as a pro-
cess that aims at problem-solving through communication – so there 
are parallels to what Habermas refers to as communicative action 
(Habermas 1984). This form of dialogue is often presented as an ideal, 
but it also has some obvious costs. First, it is often very time-
consuming. Second, it is fragile when applied as a template for nego-
tiation and dialogue between parties from different cultures, operating 
within very different norms and values. It is fragile also because of 
various internal and external factors that may influence the negotiation 
situation. The Libya case can exemplify precisely this point. 
What type of dialogue is the most representative of the relation-
ship between Libya and the West in the period studied in this 
chapter? 
The negotiations between Libya and the West prior to the 2011 revo-
lution must be seen as a good example of integrative approach. They 
were aimed at a win–win solution, and scored rather well in terms of 
the 7 elements of principled negotiations presented in the introduction 
to this report (identifying interests, people, alternatives, identifying 
options, criteria/legitimacy, commitments, communications). 
 
However, the fact that the Gaddafi regime was overthrown with the 
support of its former negotiating partners only a few years after the 
last negotiated agreement illustrates the uncertainties associated with 
negotiating with authoritarian regimes. Any leader – even a dictator – 
depends on domestic support if a negotiated agreement is to be re-
spected in the long term. Recent research on ‘audience costs’ casts 
doubts on the long-standing assumption that authoritarian regimes are 
less influenced by domestic pressure with regard to upholding agree-
ments and commitments (Snyder and Borghard 2011).  
If it does not fit with this typology – where does it differ and why? 
In the case of Libya, the level of domestic support as well as the pecu-
liar personality of the leader were of great importance in shaping in-
teractions and dialogue, as were emotional issues. While the conflicts 
between Libya and the West cannot be interpreted as what Peter 
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Coleman refers to as a ‘5%’ conflict, they may be a good example of 
Robert Mnookin’s perspective presented in his Bargaining with the 
Devil (2011). Mnookin holds that certain questions must be addressed 
before one takes the decision to opt for bargaining/ negotiation or go 
to war against certain regimes/and dictators. These questions, present-
ed in the introduction, are the following:  
 
1. What are the interests at stake? 
2. What are the alternatives to negotiation? 
3. Are there likely potential outcomes amenable to the interests 
of both parties?  
4. Is there a reasonable prospect that such an agreement would be 
implemented? 
5. What are the costs for the [West] parties of choosing to negoti-
ate? 
6. Finally, is the alternative (i.e. the use of military force) legiti-
mate and morally justifiable? 
 
In earlier periods, the answer to all these questions [by the West] went 
in favour of negotiations with Libya. This was not the case in the cri-
sis in 2011. External factors, like the Arab Spring, and internal factors 
in Libya (upraising and human rights abuse from the regime), made a 
military option legitimate. Also noteworthy is the fact that very few 
states opted for a negotiated solution in this case.  
 
Nuclear Diplomacy: the Case of Iran 
Sverre Lodgaard (NUPI) 
Introduction 
This study examines the diplomatic dimension of the conflict over 
Iran’s nuclear programme, asking why the talks have fared so poorly. 
Most of the time, they have been confined to diplomatic posturing, 
exchanging proposals that have been tightly constrained by incompat-
ible red lines graven in stone in the domestic politics of the main par-
ties. At no point have the talks been anywhere near a diplomatic solu-
tion to the problem. 
 
Sometimes actors go to the negotiations table to avoid war. That was 
the main motive when the Europeans engaged Iran in 2003. Or they 
may do so to legitimize the use of force later on, arguing that all other 
means have been tried in vain. Some US leaders seem to have enter-
tained such ideas while Israeli leaders have told them that time is up. 
Actors may also use diplomacy to buy time for other objectives. For 
years, Iran has been accused of employing stalling tactics while de-
veloping a nuclear weapons capability.  
 
Like the ‘walk in the woods’ during the euro missile negotiations in 
the 1980s, the negotiators have tried, on occasion, to twist their man-
dates in the search for progress, but have been quickly reined in. The 
Western powers have known their alternatives to a negotiated solution 
only too well: sanctions, cyber-attacks, covert operations and threats 
of war – and the other P5+1 joined them in a top–down approach. This 
was no surprise, however: in 1998, Resolution 1172 from the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) even subjected big India to that 
kind of treatment in response to its nuclear testing. In the case of India 
it was soon abandoned, but deep-seated historical enmities make 
things much harder in the case of smaller Iran. From 2005, Iran has 
pushed the nuclear programme and pursued a provocative foreign pol-
icy in defiance of the pressure levelled at it.  The name of the game 
has been power play: all the time, power politics have trumped the 
search for diplomatic solutions.   
 
While the conflict between Iran and the West is virtually all-
encompassing, this paper focuses on the nuclear issues. It begins with 
a brief account of the origins of the conflict and where Iran’s nuclear 
programme might be heading. It then identifies three turning points in 
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the diplomatic process: 2003, when Iran became more transparent and 
opened negotiations with the EU3/EU; 2005/2006, when these negoti-
ations failed and Iran was referred to the UNSC; and 2009, when Pres-
ident Obama changed US declaratory policy and the parties came 
close to agreement on a confidence-building measure. However, soon 
thereafter, Obama adopted policies similar to those of the Bush ad-
ministration.  
 
Finally, the paper analyses the diplomatic process in structural, strate-
gic, processual, behavioural and integrative terms as described by 
Zartman (Zartman 1988), It adds a discussion of domestic constraints 
and of the confidence-building functions of IAEA inspections.
11
       
Background 
Origin of the conflict 
The Iranian fuel cycle programme, which came to public attention ten 
years ago, has a long history, dating back to the Shah’s investments in 
fuel-cycle works in the mid-1970s {Mousavian, 2012 #186 39-51. Af-
ter a period of neglect following the revolution in 1979, the pro-
gramme was revived in the mid-1980s, but was kept secret till 2002, 
when an opposition movement revealed the conversion and enrich-
ment facilities in Esfahan and Natanz and the heavy-water works in 
Arak
12
. These activities had not been declared to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which started the difficult process of 
reconstructing Iran’s nuclear history in February 2003.       
 
Relations between Iran and the United States had been antagonistic for 
decades. In Iran, the enmity goes back to the coup against Muhammad 
Mossadeq in 1953. In the USA, bitterness toward Iran began with the 
hostage crisis of 1979. Diplomatic relations were broken off and US 
sanctions introduced. Ever since, there has been fertile public ground 
for punitive action. For Iran, the US became the great Satan, and Israel 
the small one. For the USA, Iran became a main adversary. 
 
It was in that context of enmity that the nuclear problem emerged. The 
timing could not have been worse. The United States was in its unipo-
lar moment, keen to convert superior military might to political ad-
                                                 
11  In the text, the books by Mohamed ElBaradei and Seyed Hossein Mousavian are cited 
several times. They are therefore referred to along with page numbers. ElBaradei was Di-
rector General of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1997 to 2009. Mousavian 
was head of the Foreign Relations Department of Iran’s National Security Council and 
spokesman for Teheran’s nuclear negotiating team from 2003 to the autumn of 2005. 
12  In mid-August 2002, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI) – an Iranian op-
position group based in Paris – held a press conference in Washington DC, disclosing 
these works. Whether the disclosure was based on the group’s own intelligence or on 
Western intelligence sources is not publicly known.  
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vantage. Having declared ‘mission accomplished’ in Iraq in the spring 
of 2003, Washington contemplated the use of force to solve the Iran 
problem. President Bush reflected on who is next: would a military 
attack on Iran be appropriate to halt the nuclear programme and bring 
Iran back into the US sphere of influence?
13
  
 
After the events of  9/11, Iran had cooperated with the USA in remov-
ing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but that did not prevent the 
Bush administration from now inscribing Iran in the ‘the axis of evil’ 
together with Iraq and North Korea. In Washington, the mantra was 
‘you don’t talk to evil. You take action against it’ {Mnookin, 2010 
#122}. If talks were to be conducted, it would have to be on European 
initiative – and that is what the UK, France and Germany (the EU3) 
set out to do. In October 2003 the EU3 foreign ministers went to Te-
heran to start negotiations that unravelled at first, but came on stream 
again with the Paris Agreement of October 2004 (IAEA 2004). The 
USA let this happen, but never believed it would yield satisfactory 
results.   
 
For the political elites in Washington, there was another grievance 
more substantial than humiliation over the hostages: the loss of a 
faithful ally in the Gulf. Iran had regained its independence after al-
most three centuries of intrusion and humiliation by the big powers – 
by Russia, the UK and the USA first of all. Ever since the Islamic rev-
olution, US administrations have toyed with the idea of regime 
change, but have not been clear about the relationship between nuclear 
reversal and regime change, or how to prioritize these objectives.  
 
The conflict is also about the role of Iran in the Middle East. Western 
powers and Sunni Arab governments try to constrain it as much as 
possible, while Iran seeks recognition of a role corresponding – some-
how – to its size and importance in the region. Many times, it has 
called for a grand bargain to normalize relations with the West and 
solve the nuclear problem in that context. All the time, Iran has been 
asking for justice and mutual respect.  
 
For Israel, on the other hand, nuclear weapons in the hands of a hostile 
Iranian leadership are what the conflict is all about. Prime Minister 
Netanyahu, Defence Minister Barak and other Israeli leaders see Iran 
as an existential threat. The Israelis are not ready to live with an Irani-
an programme that could be weaponized on short notice. The Iranians, 
however, are determined to continue their fuel-cycle works, invoking 
Art. IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which gives 
                                                 
13  When Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik visited the White House in early 
summer  2003, George W. Bush brought this question up for  reflection and discussion. 
Communication from Bondevik to the author.  
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member states the right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium 
under international safeguards (Miller 2007). For Iran, the nuclear 
programme is a high-technology prestige programme that cannot be 
discontinued without seriously compromising the nation’s hard-won 
sovereignty and independence. President Ahmadinejad, in particular, 
has raised the programme to national prominence and mobilized broad 
public support for it.  
Where is Iran’s nuclear programme heading?  
Under the leadership of Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA noted that un-
til 2003, Iran had concealed its enrichment programme. The Agency 
published a lengthy list of items that should have been reported. The 
underreporting was in obvious violation of the safeguards agreement, 
but not necessarily of the NPT.
14
 A report of November 2011, pre-
pared under the leadership of Yukio Amano, conveyed a different 
message. Now the Agency said that Iran had conducted weapons-
oriented activities up to 2003; that there were indications that such ac-
tivities had continued after that year; and that some of them might still 
be ongoing. This report made extensive use of information provided 
by IAEA member states. The US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
of 2007 had made a similar assessment of the period up to 2003, but 
claimed – with a high degree of confidence – that the weapons-
oriented works stopped that year, and – with a modest degree of con-
fidence – that they had not been resumed. Another US NIE of 2011 
was broadly consistent with that of 2007.  
 
Acquisition of fissile materials is the key to production of nuclear 
weapons. In this respect, Iran is obviously building a capability to 
produce weapons. However, there is broad agreement in the intelli-
gence communities that Iran has made no decision to weaponize the 
programme.
15
 This is far from unique: a number of NPT parties have 
long held that option without exercising it.  
 
Nevertheless, many Western political leaders appear convinced that 
Iran is about to become a nuclear weapon state. Since the mid-1980s it 
has been predicted, over and over again, that Iran may build nuclear 
weapons in anywhere between one and seven years. Such predictions 
have usually been phrased in ways that blur the distinction between 
capability and intent (Sahimi 2010), alerting people to a seemingly 
imminent danger.  
                                                 
14  For that to be the case, the items would have to be unambiguously connected with a 
weapons programme, such as development and testing of triggering mechanisms or work 
on nuclear weapon designs. Or they would reveal assistance to others in the acquisition of 
nuclear arms, which is prohibited under Art. II of the NPT. To date, there has come no 
proof of any of this.      
15  On this point, the latest US NIE says ‘We do not know…if Iran will eventually decide to 
build a bomb’ . 
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This practice has not abated. Crying wolf seems to have gained a life 
of its own. Sometimes the alarm appears to have been a matter of gen-
uine concern, and sometimes mere hype intended to underpin de-
mands for stricter punitive measures and regime change. US sanctions 
legislation calls for the latter: the strongest ones cannot be eliminated 
unless a new regime is established on terms described by the US Con-
gress. Scrapping the nuclear programme will not do.
16
  
Approaches to the problem 
Four rounds of sanctions have been mandated by the UN, and unilat-
eral US and EU sanctions have gone much further. Various kinds of 
cyber-attack have been launched, and Iranian nuclear scientists have 
been killed. Drones have been flying over Iranian territory, and covert 
operations of various kinds have been reported. Efforts have been 
made to deprive Iran of supporters and allies, and all the time there is 
the threat of using force to halt the nuclear programme. Israel and/or 
the USA are assumed to be the architects of most if not all of these 
activities. There has been much talk about sticks and carrots – but the 
sticks have been biting, and the carrots few and modest.  
 
Talks started in the autumn of 2003 between Iran and the EU3/EU and 
continued in 2006 between Iran and the P5+1 (the permanent mem-
bers of the UNSC plus Germany). Among the P5+1, the strongest 
supporters of diplomacy have been Russia and China, backed by Tur-
key and Brazil and the great majority of non-aligned states. These 
countries are less alarmist about the Iranian nuclear programme, more 
understanding of Iranian behaviour than the West, and more critical to 
Western policies than the voting patterns in international organizations 
would indicate (as can be seen from explanations of vote). For all of 
them, the common denominator is to prevent Iran from becoming a 
nuclear weapon state. Geopolitically, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, China, South Africa) countries and others do not want Iran to fall 
back into the Western sphere of influence. There is an important geo-
political fault line going by Iran. 
 
All the time, the talks have been conducted against the backdrop of 
the IAEA’s efforts to reconstruct Iran’s nuclear history and clarify the 
                                                 
16  US sanctions can be lifted only after the president certifies to Congress that the govern-
ment of Iran has: (1) released all political prisoners and detainees; (2) ceased its practices 
of violence and abuse of Iranian citizens engaging in peaceful political activity; (3) con-
ducted a transparent investigation into the killings and abuse of peaceful political activists 
in Iran and prosecuted those responsible; and (4) made progress toward establishing an 
independent judiciary. Further, the president has to certify that ‘the government of Iran 
has ceased supporting acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies certain re-
quirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism; and [that] Iran has ceased the 
pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic weap-
ons.’ Initially, the unilateral US sanctions were imposed by executive orders, meaning 
that they can be eased or even waived at the President’s discretion. In recent years, how-
ever, more and more sanctions have been enacted into law. 
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nature of its nuclear programme. Agency negotiations with Iran have 
been conducted on a bilateral basis between the secretariat and Iranian 
authorities. To some extent they have been steered by the IAEA Board 
of Governors, which became politicized over this issue, sometimes 
passing decisions by majority vote rather than by consensus as had 
been the case in the past; and from 2006 onwards the UNSC has also 
been involved.  
Turning points   
Reviewing 10 years of talks about Iran’s nuclear programme, two 
turning points stand out very clearly: the breakthrough in Iranian 
transparency and the beginning of negotiations with the EU3/EU in 
the autumn of 2003; and the breakdown of these talks and the resump-
tion of fuel-cycle activities in Iran in August 2005, leading the IAEA 
Board of Governors to refer the Iranian file to the UNSC in February 
2006 and to the ensuing imposition of UN sanctions.  
 
The second turning point coincided with the election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad to the presidency of Iran and was to some extent caused 
by him. Ahmadinejad pursued the nuclear programme with a brazen 
rhetoric that exacerbated tensions with the West and Sunni Arab 
states. As the programme advanced, his negotiating cards improved up 
to the point when, in the spring of 2012, there were discussions about 
halting the production of uranium enriched to 20 per cent and sending 
abroad what had been produced, in return for international acceptance 
of enrichment to 3–4 per cent for use in power reactors. For Iran, the 
right to enrich has always been a red line in the negotiations, but the 
United States and others have not been ready to accept that.    
 
A third turning point was expected in 2009, when Barrack Obama be-
came president of the United States. During the presidential campaign, 
Obama had declared his readiness to talk with US adversaries without 
conditions. However, new obstacles emerged, among them the unrest 
in Iran after the presidential elections in the summer of 2009 and the 
information that a new enrichment facility was being constructed at 
Fordow outside Qom, carved into mountain to protect it from air at-
tack. The facility had not been declared to the IAEA.  
 
Later, it became known that, at about the same time, Obama had au-
thorized sophisticated cyber-warfare against Iran known as Stuxnet, 
destroying hundreds of centrifuges in Natanz. Stuxnet was followed 
by other kinds of cyber-attacks.
17
 To allay Israeli fears of the Iranian 
                                                 
17  The exact timing of these decisions is not known. The US programme is led by a four-star 
general, which indicates that it is a major one, but the secrecy is pervasive. The invest-
ments in cyber-warfare and the conduct of cyber-attacks are kept in the dark. To the ex-
Inter-cultural dialogue in international crises   65 
 
65 
programme and avoid Israeli bombing of Iranian facilities, the attacks 
were conducted in collaboration with Israel (Sanger 2012). The 
change from Obama to Bush therefore became less of a turning point 
than first assumed. Meetings between Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva in 
October 2009, focusing on a concrete confidence-building measure, 
came to nought – partly because of domestic disagreements in Iran, 
and partly because the US administration was labouring under tight 
domestic constraints. By the turn of 2009/2010, Obama was back on 
the Bush Administration sanctions track.18     
2003: a golden opportunity 
On 16 October 2003, Iran’s chief negotiator Hassan Rowhani told El-
Baradei that Iran was ready to turn over a new leaf in its relationship 
with the Agency and provide full disclosure of its nuclear activities 
(ElBaradei 2011: 120-121). Iran was also ready to conclude an Addi-
tional Protocol (AP). Pending its entry into force, the Agency would 
be allowed to go by its provisions.  
 
Two factors account for much of the turnabout. One was the threat of 
war, seriously contemplated by a US Administration in a mental state 
of hubris and supported by the Israelis. Radical measures might be 
needed to avoid it. Another was the public exposure of Qadeer Khan’s 
supply network, which had delivered sensitive nuclear technology to 
Libya. Disclosure of Iran’s purchases from the same network was a 
sure consequence, so there was no better choice than to admit it.  
 
Two more factors – speculative, in the absence of documentation – 
may have worked in the same direction. First, when the nuclear pro-
gramme was revived in the midst of the war with Iraq, Saddam Hus-
sein was conducting a secret nuclear weapon programme. How much 
Iran knew about this is uncertain, but after the first Gulf War the pro-
gramme was disclosed. Today, we know that Saddam abandoned it 
and UNSCOM
19
 dismantled it, but that was not clear at the time. 
Western powers were not ready to draw that conclusion, and Saddam 
remained in power. In 2003, when no weapons of mass destruction 
were found and Saddam was removed, whatever concerns the Iranians 
might have had about Iraqi nuclear weapons disappeared. Second, 
there is a lingering suspicion that by 2003, Iran had already done so 
much on the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons that halting 
the work entailed no big sacrifice. US intelligence, now supported by 
the IAEA, has claimed that until 2003 Iran was engaged in a range of 
weapons-oriented activities.  
                                                 
tent that specific attacks have come to the public attention, such information has emerged 
long after the event.  
18  For a select list of events from these periods, see Appendix 1. 
19  The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, charged with implementing the dis-
armament provisions of SC Res. 687, the ceasefire resolution on Iraq. 
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The first attempt by the EU3/EU to keep Iran unambiguously non-
nuclear was part and parcel of this re-orientation. Not only did Iran 
promise to cooperate with the IAEA and become fully transparent, but 
on 21 October it also signed the Teheran Agreed Statement with the 
EU3/EU in which it undertook to suspend sensitive fuel-cycle works 
and negotiate a long-term solution to the controversy. The scope of the 
Statement proved contentious, however, particularly with regard to the 
uranium conversion facility at Esfahan. Iran continued work on this 
facility and began to convert uranium oxide into hexafluoride. 
 
When these negotiations unravelled, the parties signed another agree-
ment in Paris on 15 November 2004, building on the Teheran State-
ment. In the Paris Agreement, suspension of all enrichment-related 
and reprocessing activities was agreed and specified in unambiguous 
language,
20
  and the IAEA was invited to verify and monitor the sus-
pension. The EU3/EU recognized that the suspension was a temporary 
and voluntary confidence-building measure, not a legal obligation. 
 
The long-term arrangement to be negotiated on the basis of the Paris 
Agreement should provide ‘objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear 
programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes’. In return, Iran 
would get ‘firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic 
cooperation and firm commitments on security issues (IAEA 2004). 
2005/2006: a fatal turn of events    
The Paris Agreement reaffirmed the parties’ commitment to the NPT, 
but they never agreed on the operative meaning of ‘objective guaran-
tees’. Iran emphasized that compliance with the provisions of the 
NPT, full transparency and application of the AP was all that an NPT 
member can legitimately be asked to accept. The EU3/EU emphasized 
that exercise of the ‘inalienable right’ to develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes must be in conformity with Articles I and II of the 
NPT. They further argued that, in view of Iran’s long record of con-
cealment and non-compliance with international obligations, the only 
way the international community could be confident that Iran was not 
intent on producing nuclear weapons would be for Iran to forego all 
enrichment and reprocessing activities for a period, to be defined. 
They probably had in mind a moratorium of 20 years or so.  
 
At the core of the Framework for a Long-Term Agreement offered by 
the EU3/EU on 5 August 2005 were assurances of fuel supply for Ira-
                                                 
20  Iran undertook to ‘continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related 
and reprocessing activities, and, specifically: the manufacture and import of gas centri-
fuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centri-
fuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any pluto-
nium separation installation; and all tests or production of any uranium conversion instal-
lation’ .  
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nian power reactors, in return for a halt to all fuel-cycle activities 
(Framework 2005). While international supply arrangements can nev-
er be as reliable as domestic sources of supply – the proposed buffer 
store would be located outside Iran – the credibility of these assuranc-
es was high. They had been made by a group of states and communi-
cated to all interested parties through an international organization 
(the IAEA), and thus could not be abruptly withdrawn by any individ-
ual government.  
 
The framework recognized Iran’s right to develop a nuclear power 
programme, but stopped short of offering Iran light-water reactors. 
Article IV of the NPT commits supplier states to facilitate access to 
technology for non-nuclear-weapon states parties, but the Framework 
promised only ‘not to impede participation in open competitive ten-
dering’ (Framework 2005: para. 19b). 
 
In addition to ratifying the AP, Iran should undertake to cooperate 
pro-actively with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, ‘includ-
ing by allowing IAEA inspectors to visit any site or interview any per-
son they deem relevant to their monitoring of nuclear activity in Iran’. 
To this, Iran noted that such inspections would go beyond the Addi-
tional Protocol, and saw this demand as an intimidating infringement 
on national sovereignty (Iran 2005). 
 
According to the Paris guidelines, the long-term agreement 
‘will…provide…firm commitments on security issues’. The offer in-
cluded nothing of the sort. Neither was it easy for the EU3/EU to do 
so, since the main threat to Iranian security came from the USA. 
Washington kept Iran under high pressure and conducted contingency 
planning for a military attack. 
 
The EU3/EU kept the US well-informed about the negotiations. The 
Americans made two gestures that conveyed a semblance of support, 
while staying at a distance: they would no longer object to negotia-
tions for Iranian membership of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and they were willing to provide spare parts for Iranian civil-
ian aircraft. There is a long way, however, from the start of WTO ne-
gotiations to their successful conclusion. Talks can derail in a great 
many ways. Moreover, providing spare parts for civilian aircraft of US 
origin ought to be a matter of course. Refusal put civilians at risk 
without in any way affecting Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
Thus, the US side did not invest in the talks, but as long as the Euro-
peans stayed committed to halting all fuel-cycle works in Iran diplo-
macy could do no harm. At a time of considerable disagreement with-
in the US government – some advocating a military attack for regime 
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change, others preferring diplomacy on the basis of a set of conditions 
to be met in advance, and yet others favouring dialogue and negotia-
tions without preconditions – they could only be helpful in buying 
time. However, the US never gave them much of a chance beyond be-
ing a holding manoeuvre.  
 
For several months, there were high expectations of major steps to-
ward an overall diplomatic solution. At the March 2005 meeting of the 
IAEA Board, Iran was not on the agenda, for the first time in almost 
two years. In Iran, however, criticism was mounting as the negotia-
tions failed to make visible headway. Well before they received the 
European offer, Iranian officials indicated that they would not contin-
ue with the full suspension (ElBaradei 2011). On 1 August, they an-
nounced that uranium conversion at Esfahan would resume. 
 
A few days later, the European offer was presented. The Iranian re-
sponse was sharp: ‘the proposal is extremely long on demands…(and) 
absurdly short on offers to Iran…(and) amounts to an insult to the Ira-
nian nation (Iran 2005).  
 
From then on, the conflict escalated rapidly. On 24 September, the 
IAEA Board characterized Iran’s history of concealment and reporting 
failures as constituting ‘non-compliance’, a term that foreshadowed 
referral of the Iranian file to the Security Council. In January 2006, 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that ‘the time for talking 
outside the Security Council is over’ (Pleming 2006). On February 4, 
the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran to the Security Council 
and the next day, Iran withdrew from the AP – as it had said it would 
do. Two months later, the updated US National Security Strategy 
named Iran the single greatest threat to the United States.  
2006–2009: posturing over a vexing problem 
When Iran reverted to the standard safeguards agreement, the IAEA 
gradually lost overview of what was going on. On occasion, the 
Agency was allowed to go beyond the agreement, but only at Iran’s 
discretion.
21
 It could no longer follow the production of centrifuges, 
only register installation of them where fissile materials were used. In 
2007, the problem was compounded by the fact that Iran also reverted 
to the original safeguards provision requiring states to notify the IAEA 
180 days before a new facility would be operational. In 2003, it had 
accepted the new code 3.1. of the subsidiary safeguards arrangement 
which requires notification as soon as a decision to build a new facili-
                                                 
21  The main example was the work plan agreed in the autumn of 2008, containing a timeta-
ble for the resolution of all the outstanding inspection issues. Many questions were clari-
fied, but a few remained, chiefly those pertaining to the so-called ‘alleged studies’ that 
stemmed from an Iranian laptop that had landed in US hands, the authenticity of which 
remains in doubt.    
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ty has been made – as the last country to do so. Now it withdrew uni-
laterally – as the first to do that. From then on, the building of new 
enrichment plants could go far without the Agency being informed. 
Generally, enrichment leaves a weak signature, so national intelli-
gence may fail to register new activities. 
 
The new government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad speeded the nuclear 
programme up. Uranium conversion resumed in August 2005 and en-
richment R&D in January 2006. In the following years, Iranian centri-
fuge capacity grew steadily. Between 2006 and 2009 there were next 
to no formal negotiations that could have introduced constraints. Pro-
posals were exchanged and the chief negotiators and others met, but 
there was only one brief official meeting between Iran and the P5+1, 
in July 2008.  
 
On European initiative, the P5+1 presented a new proposal in June 
2006 which was more generous than the previous one in both sub-
stance and tone. Unlike the EU3/EU offer of August 2005, the big 
powers committed to actively support the building of new light-water 
reactors in Iran using state-of-the-art technology. They also offered to 
improve Iran’s access to the international economy through practical 
support for full integration into international structures, including the 
WTO, and to create a framework for increased direct investments   
and trade with Iran including a trade and economic cooperation 
agreement with the EU. Steps would be taken to improve access to 
key goods and technology. These and other provisions were presented 
without the patronizing tone of the first offer. However, the proposal 
repeated the demand for suspension of enrichment as a precondition 
for negotiations, and it left the impression that resumption of such ac-
tivities would be predicated on Western approval.  
 
Iran waited until 22 August to respond. Domestic bargaining seemed 
as complex as ever. But the Western powers did not wait, and the oth-
er veto powers went along: in late July another Security Council reso-
lution was adopted which made suspension mandatory under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. What could not be agreed under the NPT was 
now made illegal by the Security Council. 
 
On 22 August Iran responded, as promised, citing ambiguities in the 
P5+1 proposal and asking approximately one hundred questions of 
clarification – but also declaring its willingness to negotiate on ‘all 
issues’ (Mousavian 2012: 253). ElBaradei remained convinced that 
the Iranians were open to the idea of suspension so long as it was not a 
precondition of negotiations; that they were willing to implement the 
AP on a voluntary basis during the talks; and that they were ready to 
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commit to permanent membership in the NPT to allay fears of a 
breakout scenario in the style of North Korea. 
 
Iran’s chief negotiator, Ali Larijani, tried to find a way around the 
suspension problem by limiting enrichment to the one or two cascades 
already in operation, or to a total of no more than 3000 centrifuges. 
Another possibility would be some form of suspension in return for 
security assurances. Complete suspension up front seemed out of the 
question, but in Washington that requirement was firm: not one centri-
fuge. 
 
The period 2006–2009 also saw an Iranian ‘Proposed package for 
constructive negotiations’ (May 2008); a third proposal from the 
EU3/EU, largely reiterating previous positions (June 2008); a similar 
repeat by Iran a few days later; and the meeting in Geneva between 
the Iranian chief negotiator Saeed Jalili and the P-5+1 in July 2008. At 
this meeting, the parties went through the motions and repeated their 
positions, but to little or no avail.  
 
In Geneva, the USA was for the first time represented by a high offi-
cial, Undersecretary of State William J. Burns. Moussavian’s sum-
mary of what the Americans wanted to achieve seems accurate: to 
show agreement with the other members of the P5+1; to prove that 
they were in favour of diplomatic means; and to convince the other 
P5+1 that if negotiations failed, there would be no alternative to more 
sanctions (Mousavian 2012: 311). In September, the Security Council 
passed its third sanctions resolution, with a fourth soon to follow. 
2009 – : a glimpse of hope – and further escalation  
When Obama became president of the United States, there was a radi-
cal change of tone and atmosphere. Here was the man who had de-
clared his willingness to talk to US adversaries without preconditions. 
Ahmadinejad sent a letter congratulating him on his election. 
 
The United States and Russia came up with a promising suggestion. 
Iran would receive fuel for the Teheran Research Reactor, which had 
worked on 20 per cent enriched uranium provided by Argentina, in 
return for transferring most of its low-enriched uranium abroad. Of the 
1500 kilograms of LEU that Iran had produced at the time, 1200 
would be sent abroad. In that way, Iran would demonstrate that its en-
richment programme was for peaceful purposes. For the sceptics, what 
would remain in Iran was – if further enriched to weapons-grade – less 
than one bomb’s worth. Most important for Iran, it was not being 
asked to stop or suspend its enrichment. The proposal had the poten-
tial to defuse the enrichment issue and pave the way for serious nego-
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tiations. As a confidence-building measure, such a swap made good 
sense. 
 
On 1 October 2009, Iran and the P5+1 met in Geneva to discuss the 
proposal. On the margins of the meeting, Burns and Jalili met bilater-
ally – the highest-level bilateral meeting between the two states in 30 
years. In principle, the parties agreed to pursue the fuel swap. Another 
meeting would convene three weeks later to hammer out the details.
22
 
 
And that is where the devil proved to have taken hold. In Iran, it was 
payback time. Ahmadinejad, who had undermined Larijani’s efforts to 
limit the enrichment programme and pursue the diplomatic track, sup-
ported the proposal, but now Larijani opposed it. Moussavi, prime 
minister in the 1980s when the nuclear programme was revived and 
front figure of the ‘greens’ during the 2009 presidential elections, did 
the same. In the aftermath of the contested re-election of Ahmad-
inejad, the rivalries between institutions and individuals in the exceed-
ingly complex Iranian political system became more intense than ever.  
 
In the run-up to the Geneva meeting, the Americans put their finger on 
a new enrichment facility being built at Fordow, thirty km north of the 
holy city of Qom. They said they had known about it for two years, 
but had not been ready to go public with it (ElBaradei 2011: 297-299). 
The facility was of a limited size that arguably made it unsuitable for 
industrial purposes. Still, the signals from all sides indicated a desire 
to conclude the fuel-swap deal. 
 
In the discussions, the parties were innovative in their search for mo-
dalities, well assisted by ElBaradei. Still, they failed to agree, largely 
because of the domestic rivalries in Iran. In an illuminating reflection 
of US politics vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic, the Americans clarified 
that they could not themselves be a party to an agreement with Iran. 
However, they were ready to write a letter of support for the deal.  
 
This was the closest that the parties ever came to a negotiated agree-
ment. By the turn of 2009/2010, Obama was back on the Bush admin-
istration track. In April 2011, Gary Samore explained this continuity 
in policy in broader terms: ‘..both the Bush administration and the 
Obama administration have emphasized that the first step is for Iran to 
comply with the UN Security Council resolutions and restore confi-
dence in its nuclear programme.’23 The resolutions demanded that Iran 
stop all fuel cycle works, accept the AP and allow unlimited inspec-
tions beyond the AP, before fuel cycle activities could be continued 
                                                 
22  For an analysis of the fuel-swap negotiations, see Parsi . 
23  ”Obama advisor Gary Samore, “The Ball is Very Much in Tehran’s Court”’, RFE/RL, 14 
April 2011, www.rferl.org/content/interview-
_samore_russia_iran_us_policy/3557326.html- 
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and before sanctions could be lifted – it being anybody’s guess how 
long Iran would have to wait. ElBaradei summarizes his fuel-swap 
experiences this way: ‘..the pattern was familiar: nothing would satis-
fy, short of Iran coming to the table completely undressed’ (ElBaradei 
2011: 313).   
 
In the spring of 2010, Turkey and Brazil managed to strike a deal with 
Iran along the same lines. By that time Iran had produced 2500 kilo-
grams of LEU, so a swap that would bring 1200 kilograms out of the 
country seemed less attractive to the West. Brazil and Turkey also 
recognized Iran’s right to enrich under the NPT. The next day, the 
P5+1 announced that they had reached agreement on a fourth sanc-
tions resolution on Iran for not having stopped its enrichment pro-
gramme. Hillary Clinton branded the agreement a ‘transparent ploy’ 
by Iran to avoid new sanctions (Lee 2010).   
 
Another meeting of the P5+1 and Iran took place in Istanbul in Janu-
ary 2011, followed by three more meetings in Istanbul, Bagdad and 
Moscow in April, May and June 2012. Ahead of the April meeting in 
Istanbul expectations were raised, inter alia because Iran and the 
IAEA seemed close to an agreement on inspections in Parchin, where 
it was intimated that Iran had tested trigger mechanisms for nuclear 
weapons. Having more than 10,000 centrifuges spinning, some of 
them enriching to 20 per cent for use in the Teheran Research Reactor, 
the goal posts had been moved to speculations about doing away with 
20 per cent enrichment in return for limitations of sanctions and ac-
ceptance, in principle, of Iran’s right to enrich. That, however, proved 
off the mark. In Moscow, the talks were called off indefinitely, and 
there were no inspections at Parchin.  
Analysis 
The structural perspective  
Iran’s nuclear programme surfaced at the peak of the US unipolar 
moment and Iran was treated accordingly: top–down. For Washington, 
there was no need to negotiate: talks were rewards for good behaviour, 
not means to achieve results. Overwhelming power would do the job. 
Power politics was somewhat tempered by the vexing problems in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, where Iran was called upon to assist, but it was 
not until the election of Barack Obama that the declaratory policy 
changed in favour of negotiations based on mutual respect.  
 
The Europeans stepped in to negotiate, not least in order to avoid an-
other war. They saw themselves as a ‘human shield’ against the use of 
force. Still, they were under the impact of US power and disbelief in 
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negotiations, which may explain why their August 2005 offer to Iran 
was so thin on substance. It was not deemed appropriate to offer 
much. Or, they were trying to negotiate bazaar style, not bringing out 
all their carrots up front (ElBaradei 2011: 144). That the June 2006 
offer was more forthcoming than the first one suggests that this may 
have been so. In any case, the Europeans gravely misread develop-
ments in Iran. 
 
Disappointed by the results of the negotiations, the new government 
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took corrective action. Iran adopted a more 
aggressive foreign policy, raised its regional ambitions, pursued the 
nuclear programme with greater vigour, and turned to the East and 
South for political support.
24
 Ahmadinejad appointed Ali Larijani, 
who had stressed the importance of ties with China and Russia, as his 
chief nuclear negotiator; courted the non-aligned movement; and tried 
to gain acceptance for Iranian membership of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization, but in vain. In part, this was a general foreign poli-
cy orientation; in part, it was also a tactic to weather the nuclear crisis.  
 
This way, Iran raised the stakes – and so did the West. First, by ob-
taining a mandatory Security Council resolution which denied Iran the 
right to do fuel-cycle works. Second, by a series of UN sanctions reso-
lutions followed by comprehensive US and European sanctions block-
ing oil imports from Iran and black-listing the Iranian central bank. 
Third, by cyber-attacks to delay the enrichment programme and by 
covert operations to stir unrest and gather information. Also, nuclear 
scientists were assassinated. All the time, the military option was kept 
alive.   
 
When the negotiations between Iran and the EU3/EU ran aground in 
2005 and a new government came to power in Iran, the talks between 
Iran and the P5+1 were reduced to exchanges of proposals and probes 
to clarify the other side’s flexibilities or the lack of such. The probes 
were generally left to the representative of the EU (Solana, Ashton) 
and the secretary of the Iranian National Security Council in his ca-
pacity of chief negotiator (Rowhani, Larijani, Jalili). There was one 
exception: the talks about the fuel swap in the autumn of 2009, when 
the parties seemed genuinely interested in confidence-building, but 
which failed due to adverse domestic circumstances, chiefly but not 
only in Iran. 
 
Why did Russia and China go along with the other P5 on so many 
proposals and Security Council resolutions?  
 
                                                 
24  Ahmadinejad and his team preferred the phrase ‘expansion of capacities’ rather than 
‘looking to the East’ to describe the new foreign policy orientation. 
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Russia always wanted to prevent Iran from completing the fuel cycle. 
In this respect, it has been attuned to the USA and the EU all the time. 
It undertook to finish the Bushehr reactor and would certainly wel-
come more reactor contracts. Not only for economic reasons, but be-
cause command over parts of the Iranian nuclear programme would 
provide good bargaining chips in negotiations with the West: if you 
are more cooperative in this or that respect, we will be more coopera-
tive on Iran. Russia was always ready to use the Iranian card to extract 
concessions from the Western powers. To the Iranians, this confirmed 
that their suspicions of the Russians were not only historically rooted, 
but based on contemporary realities as well.  
 
Working relations with Iran are valuable conduits for Russian influ-
ence in the Middle East and important for regaining influence in cen-
tral Asia. In that connection, Iran’s support for Moscow in Chechnya 
has been duly noted. Overall, however, relations with the West are far 
more important to Russia than are relations with Iran. In the face of 
important trade-offs with the West, Iranian concerns are expendable.  
 
For China, too, relations with the US clearly trump those with Iran. 
China’s stakes in Iranian oil production have been fast growing, and it 
has exported arms to US adversaries like Iran to enhance its bargain-
ing power with Washington over arms deliveries to Taiwan. Political-
ly, however, the relationship is not very comprehensive, and has no 
strategic bonds. Both China and Russia have worked to modify UN 
resolutions and like the other BRICS countries, China is for diploma-
cy and against the use of force. But as long as Russia accommodates 
to Western policies, China has had little reason to break out of the P5 
consensus. 
 
Ahmadinejad’s turn to the East was, therefore, not much of a success. 
Ali Larijani – guided by principles but also pragmatism – was among 
the first to realize this. Regardless of foreign policy orientation, Iran 
remained solidly stuck in its confrontation with the West and its dif-
ferences with the P5+1.   
The strategic perspective 
There was never a shared strategic vision of what to go for. The Paris 
Agreement foreshadowed ‘objective guarantees’ that the Iranian pro-
gramme would be a peaceful one, in return for which Iran would re-
ceive nuclear technology and security guarantees. Months later, the 
Europeans made it clear that ‘objective guarantees’ meant suspension 
of all fuel-cycle activities for an indefinite period. In the face of US 
and Israeli threats, the EU3 were in no position to provide security as-
surances.  
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Neither was there a shared perspective of what the talks should com-
prise. In 2003 Iran proposed a grand bargain, resolving the nuclear 
problem in the framework of Middle East politics writ large. The US 
scoffed at it and even reprimanded the messenger for having conveyed 
it.
25
 The negotiations with the EU3/EU comprised a range of issues in 
addition to the nuclear one, as did the P5+1 offer of June 2006. How-
ever, the United States never believed in the EU exercise, and in hind-
sight,  the P5+1 offer of June 2006 seems to have been a means to ob-
tain Russian and Chinese support for the Chapter VII resolution that 
ordered Iran to stop all fuel-cycle works, including R&D. In practice, 
the verification requirements of the proposal amounted to indefinite 
suspension, which Iran was sure to reject – and Iranian rejection 
would make P5+1 consensus easier to achieve.  
 
Later, Iran made more proposals for a comprehensive settlement with 
the West.
26
 In the words of Mousavian, ‘Iranians have always believed 
that reconciliation with the United States should come in the form of a 
broad-based policy, not with a piece-meal deal on the nuclear issue, 
unless a nuclear deal is comprehensive and covers Iran’s full rights’ 
(Mousavian 2012: 247). Iran therefore wanted direct contact with the 
United States, without which such a deal could never be struck. At one 
point in the fuel-swap negotiations it even proposed that Iranian LEU 
could be held in US custody – a clear invitation to bilateral talks with 
the Americans.  
 
For the Bush administration, a comprehensive settlement was out of 
the question for many reasons, inter alia because it would amount to 
recognition of the Islamic republic, and in the fuel-swap negotiations 
Obama made it clear that the USA could not be a party to any deal 
with Iran. Washington never abandoned the objective of regime 
change in Iran; it always demanded suspension of fuel-cycle activities 
as a condition for negotiations; and use of force was always an option. 
Iran, on its part, did not exclude another suspension – but then as a 
result of negotiations, not as a precondition for holding them.    
Exchange of concessions 
Both the Rafsanjani and the Khatami governments had tried to mend 
fences with the West, especially the EU. When developments in 2003 
called for a radical change of nuclear policy, the Khatami team made 
sweeping concessions to get negotiations with the EU going and bring 
hostilities to an end. In this period, the EU3 became key economic 
partners for Iran. 
                                                 
25  This was the Swiss caretaker of US interests in Iran, Tim Guldiman. 
26  For instance, in May 2006 ElBaradei conveyed a message from Larijani to Condoleezza 
Rice: ‘The Iranians were interested in direct talks with the United States. They were ready 
to discuss not only Iran’s nuclear issues, but also Iraq, Afghanistan, Hezbollah, and Ha-
mas’   194. 
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The Iranian concessions up front were expanded somewhat during the 
negotiations. The EU3/EU made a comprehensive offer at the end. 
Concessions were not traded step by step. 
 
Between 2006 and 2009 the parties were shadow-boxing from a dis-
tance, leaving it to Solana and Larijani/Jalili to look for openings. 
When supporters of diplomacy seemed to make progress, they were 
undermined. The spoilers had the upper hand. 
 
In October 2009, the parties had an intense give-and-take over the 
proposed fuel swap. This would have been a confidence-building 
measure, far from a solution to the nuclear problem, but partly for that 
reason and partly because of Obama’s initial commitment to diploma-
cy, this was as close as they ever came to a negotiated agreement on 
anything. To clinch the deal, the negotiators were quite innovative, but 
could not overcome the domestic constraints they were labouring un-
der. 
 
It was not until the Istanbul meeting of April 2012 that Iran and the 
P5+1 agreed on a step-by-step approach based on reciprocity.
27
 At that 
point, there were expectations of a productive continuation. However, 
the approach was not followed up in practice. In Baghdad, the P5+1 
asked Iran to meet three conditions: stop 20 per cent enrichment, ship 
out its stockpile of 100 kg of 20 per cent enriched uranium, and close 
the heavily fortified enrichment plant at Fordow. Iran was open to the 
first demand, but not to the others. In Moscow, the US side empha-
sized that this was not an opening salvo that could be negotiated or 
addressed piecemeal, but a take-it-or-leave-it position.
28
 Iran wanted 
easing of sanctions and, as always, recognition of the right to enrich.  
 
As so many times before, the talks did not come to much more than 
exchanges of different positions and proposals. Diplomats described 
them as ‘the dialogue of the deaf’. What had been announced as a sus-
tained process of serious dialogue was called off indefinitely. Tech-
nical meetings would be held to explore the opportunities for resump-
tion of talks.   
Agreed criteria 
Ashton’s summary of the April 2012 talks in Istanbul had an interest-
ing ambiguity: ‘We have agreed that the non-proliferation treaty forms 
a key basis for what must be serious engagement to ensure that all the 
                                                 
27  ‘..we will be guided by the principle of the step-by-step approach and reciprocity’ .  
Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the E3+3 following the 
talks with Iran, Istanbul, 14 April 2012. European Union, Brussels, 14 April 2012. A 
173/12. 
28  Laura Rosen, ‘US seen hardening its position in Iran nuclear talks’, http://backchannel.al-
monitor.com/index.php/tag/eu-33/ 
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obligations under the treaty are met while fully respecting Iran’s right 
to the peaceful use of nuclear energy’ (Ashton 2012). Some wanted to 
read this as an overture to a solution based on the right to enrich in 
return for comprehensive inspections ensuring that all obligations un-
der the Treaty were met – in accordance with the principles of the 
NPT and the extra inspection activities needed to clarify the remnants 
of the past. However, the phrase ‘a key basis’ suggests that the NPT 
was not the only one: another basis was the Security Council resolu-
tions requiring Iran to suspend all fuel-cycle works and accede to the 
Additional Protocol.  
 
Meeting ‘all obligations under the treaty’ is, moreover, an elastic no-
tion. Suspicions of secret weapons-oriented activities have run so deep 
that it takes a lot to put them to rest – nor are proponents of regime 
change necessarily interested in that. The case of Iran stands in stark 
contrast to Argentina and Brazil, which have more advanced enrich-
ment programmes than Iran and which never accepted the Additional 
Protocol, yet enjoy full fuel-cycle rights. In Iran, ‘objective guaran-
tees’ of peaceful intent start with suspension, and even R&D on nu-
clear enrichment is seen as a threat to international peace and security. 
This shows how utterly embedded the Iranian case is in politics and 
lack of trust.  
 
For the Iranians, suspicions of weapons-oriented activities are sources 
of mounting and seemingly endless problems. In some respects, how-
ever, ambiguity also works to their advantage. Because of their nucle-
ar programme they have been basking in international attention, leav-
ing Egypt and other Arab states in the shadows. And to the extent that 
others believe they are dealing with a would-be nuclear weapon state, 
they may be more inclined to accommodate to Iranian interests. For 
instance, when the UAE ambassador to Washington says that if Iran 
crosses the threshold, the Gulf states may have to turn away from the 
USA and accommodate to Iran, ambiguity seems to be working in 
Iran’s favour,29 adding weight to Iran’s voice in the Middle East.  
Confidence-building: the functions of IAEA inspections 
The talks were conducted against the backdrop of IAEA safeguards 
and negotiations with Iran about the modalities of inspections. The 
inspections always had the potential to build confidence, but from 
February 2006 the Agency was no longer in a position to search for 
facilities that might not have been declared.   
 
                                                 
29  ‘..the United Arab Emirates ambassador to the United States told Jeffrey Goldberg of the 
Atlantic magazine in 2010 that if the United States allowed Iran to cross the nuclear 
threshold, the small Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region would have no choice but 
to leave the American orbit and align themselves with Iran out of self-protection’ 
Zuckermann, U.S. News and World Report, March 12, 2012..  
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The parties made active use of IAEA reports to influence the course of 
events. The Western powers shared information with the Agency at 
times of their choosing to alert it to suspicious activities. On one occa-
sion, the US President also did his best to cast doubt on his own Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which did not conform to his alle-
gations against Iran: in response to the 2007 NIE, Bush maintained 
that Iran was dangerous. Something similar happened in 2011, when 
the new NIE held on to much the same conclusion, but with little im-
pact on the statements of US politicians. The list of predictions claim-
ing that Iran could or would get nuclear weapons in the more or less 
immediate future grew steadily longer. 
 
When the Iran file went to the Security Council and Iran withdrew 
from the AP, later also from code 3.1. of the subsidiary arrangement, 
the Agency lost track of ongoing activities. For instance, it could no 
longer follow Iran’s production of centrifuges – how many, where, 
and of what kind – only register what was installed at the declared fa-
cility in Natanz. Sometimes, Iran was nevertheless open to more in-
spections in order to influence debates in the IAEA  Board and up-
coming talks with the P5+1 – but the scope of the unknown grew, and 
with it the potential for speculations. 
 
In 2007, Iran and the IAEA agreed on a work plan to resolve the out-
standing issues of the past. After a few months, only one issue re-
mained: the alleged weaponization studies originating from a laptop 
that the USA had received in 2004, containing information about the 
‘Green Salt’ (uranium tetrafluorid, UF4) project, high explosives test-
ing, design of a missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear 
warhead, and administrative interconnections between these studies. 
Taken together, they pointed to a possible nuclear weapons pro-
gramme. The problem was to verify the authenticity of the infor-
mation, because the Americans would not reveal the source and would 
not let the Agency show the material to the Iranians as a basis for in-
vestigations. After a while, the IAEA got pieces of information that it 
could present to Iran, and discussions began. However, two days be-
fore the Governing Board was scheduled to review the report on the 
progress that had been made, the Security Council adopted another 
sanctions resolution. In an act of defiance, Ahmadinejad announced 
plans to expand enrichment operations, and discussions of the alleged 
weaponization studies stalled. ElBaradei got the impression that at this 
point, Iran was playing wait-and-see with the coming shift in the US 
administration. 
 
Sometimes Western demands for more inspections were made in the 
knowledge that nobody can prove a negative and in the hope of find-
ing incriminating evidence. Iran claimed that more access gave rise to 
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more questions: except for the work plan, it therefore opened up only 
partially, in calculated moves for specific political ends. Under such 
circumstances, the confidence-building effect of inspections is ques-
tionable. Again and again, inspections have been turned and twisted 
for political ends. 
 
That conclusion was corroborated by the fact that when the IAEA re-
ported on the progress under the work plan, the report was belittled by 
the West. The USA emphasized that the report was damning for Iran, 
‘presumably because some of the allegations about weaponization 
studies had been openly stated for the first time’ (ElBaradei 2011: : 
281). Iran did the opposite, claiming that it was a total victory that 
vindicated its nuclear programme.  
Domestic constraints  
In both Teheran and Washington, the Iranian nuclear programme has 
been a matter of intense contention between rivalling political groups. 
In 2005, Ahmadinejad was ready to draw conclusions from Khatami’s 
failure to reach an understanding with the West. After a brief period of 
re-orientation towards the East, he and his chief nuclear negotiator, 
Ali Larijani, returned to talks with the West, but were constrained by 
hardening positions in other parts of the Iranian political system. On 
many occasions, the Iranians tried to get in direct contact with the 
Americans, although they were not uniformly in favour of this, de-
pending on the circumstances. Among the key decision-makers, the 
supreme leader appears to have been the most restrictive on conces-
sions and deals with the West.  
   
In the autumn of 2009, Ahmadinejad appeared genuinely interested in 
a fuel-swap deal, but came under fire from his critics in the reformist 
and conservative camps alike. His opponents wanted to deny him the 
success of an agreement with the West, and they succeeded. In the 
turbulent aftermath of the presidential elections, the Iranian political 
system became bogged down in institutional and personal rivalries. 
Leaders threatened to bring each other before the court, and Ahmad-
inejad was unable to exploit the opportunity represented by the new 
US president. However, by the time the 2012 talks started, the rival-
ries had calmed down and the system seemed to have come more or 
less back to normal. Clearly, the supreme leader was now in charge. 
No red line could be adopted without his consent. 
 
Under Ahmadinejad, the nuclear programme became the signal ex-
pression of Iranian sovereignty and independence, which had been 
hallmarks of the revolution. In all its dealings with other countries Iran 
demanded respect and justice. There is nothing to indicate that the Ira-
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nian political elite will change its strategic calculations in the face of 
sanctions and other punitive measures taken against it.  
 
In the United States, the Bush Administration was reluctant to negoti-
ate and the Obama administration has had little leeway for compro-
mise. The USA is strongly pro-Israel and strongly anti-Iran. It is not 
prepared to recognize Iran’s right to indigenous fuel-cycle capabili-
ties. Doing so would mean recognizing Iran as a legitimate state with 
legitimate national interests, and also as a regional power pursuing 
policies independent of Washington. With the ingrained image of Iran 
as a major threat, and American sensitivities to Israeli interests, there 
is no room for that in the US political landscape.   
 
In Istanbul, there was agreement on a step-by-step approach based on 
reciprocity. For Iran, sanctions relief was at the top of the wish list, 
but Washington was unwilling and unable to concede to a gradual lift-
ing of them. Initially, the unilateral sanctions were imposed by execu-
tive orders and could therefore be reversed by the executive – but do-
mestic political realities rules it out. Later, the most comprehensive 
sanctions have been enacted in law and made conditional on radical 
political re-orientations that amount to regime change in Iran.  
 
Russian, Chinese and German diplomats believe that, in return for the 
right to enrich, Iran would accept comprehensive safeguards as well as 
limitations on the degree of enrichment and where to do it. They hold 
that that this would have to be at the core of a diplomatic settlement, 
but that does not square with the red lines in Washington. The Istan-
bul–Baghdad–Moscow sequence demonstrated Obama’s lack of flexi-
bility on these essentials. His motivation seems to have been to buy 
time and hold back the Israelis for the duration of the re-election cam-
paign. 
Personality factors: the role of leaders and negotiators   
US and Iranian leaders and negotiators have been heavily constrained 
by their domestic political surroundings, so there has been little 
chance for personal initiatives and personality traits to play a role in 
the conduct of diplomacy. What came closest was the Solana–Larijani 
relationship. The two men spent much time together, also behind 
closed doors, and probably had as good a working relationship as the 
difficult framework conditions would tolerate.  
 
Both of them were pragmatic negotiators with personal stakes in dip-
lomatic progress. Larijani recounted a phone call with Solana immedi-
ately after Resolution 1696 of July 2006 had been adopted – which 
made any fuel cycle activity including enrichment R&D a threat to 
international peace and security – in which Solana said, ‘The spoilers 
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have done their job’ (Mousavian p. 252). A few months later, it ap-
peared that Solana and Larijani had achieved a two-page agreement 
whereby Iran would agree not to launch new cascades for enrichment 
for a period of two months as a voluntary, non-binding and temporary 
measure, if UN sanctions were lifted.
30
 This was a variation of El-
Baradei’s freeze-for-freeze proposal a little earlier, according to which 
Iran would stop adding new centrifuges while the P5+1 would refrain 
from new sanctions resolutions. The USA turned it down, but the oth-
er powers agreed to give Solana more time before considering more 
sanctions. However, it ended in a second sanctions resolution, 
Res.1747 of March 2007.  
 
New negotiations between Solana and Larijani started in the spring of 
2007. There were indications of a possible agreement between them, 
and the BBC reported that Larijani had carried an unofficial proposal 
for limited suspension which had been turned down by the EU. It was 
also rejected, out of hand, by Ahmadinejad. A third round took place 
in the summer of 2007. Shortly thereafter, Larijani resigned amid 
fierce criticism from Ahmadinejad, who complained about clandestine 
negotiations between ‘some people’ and the European countries – 
meaning Larijani. The rift between them was quite deep, Ahmadinejad 
being idealistic and aggressive, whereas Larijani was more pragmatic 
and attuned to international conditions and global power equations. 
 
When Larijani resigned, ‘all of his efforts to find a formula for sus-
tained negotiations with the P5+1 had been blocked’ (ElBaradei 2011: 
266). He was replaced by Saeed Jalili, known as a hardline conserva-
tive.  
 
In one respect, the Solana–Larijani talks were similar to the ‘walk in 
the woods’ during the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) negotiations 
of the 1980s, featuring Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky. In yet another 
wave of rearmament and East–West confrontation, they had a bilateral 
conversation on the margins of their instructions to find a way out of 
the stalled negotiations. Solana and Larijani seem to have done much 
the same.  
Bargaining with a view to a win–win solution  
Search for win–win outcomes requires mutual understanding to make 
communications effective. As a minimum, both parties must be able to 
present the positions of the other in their own words, yet in such a way 
that the other would agree (Deutsch 1963). Negotiating positions are 
not the same as national interests, however, and a fair reading of na-
tional interests requires proper understanding of the social, economic 
                                                 
30  Published by the Washington Post half a year later  254. 
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and political factors that determine the policies of ‘the other’. This has 
been lacking between Iran and the West, especially on the part of the 
USA.  It also requires political space and legitimacy for efforts to 
comprehend, and there has not been much of that either.  
 
After the Iranian revolution, the US and Iran exchanged condemna-
tions, not diplomats. US–Iranian affairs were down to a minimum, so 
knowledge of Iranian affairs was in low demand. US governmental 
expertise evaporated for lack of career prospects. The superpower was 
united around adversarial attitudes, took the high ground and spoke 
power politics. It knew what to say and do, so not only did those who 
could present nuances and alternative readings of Iranian affairs be-
come superfluous: at times they also became a nuisance. Iranian un-
derstanding of the US suffered as well, but the smaller party always 
has to be more attentive to the behaviour of the big adversary than 
vice versa. European–Iranian affairs were in a better state although in 
recent years, EU diplomats have been hard put to gain access to Irani-
an governmental circles.  
 
To the extent that there was a search for win–win options, it took 
place a step below the top decision-making level, between chief nego-
tiators who had developed a personal interest in diplomatic progress. 
Negotiators are sometimes tempted to finesse and stretch their man-
dates, probing the scene to achieve results, and Solana and Larijani 
tried their luck. So did ElBaradei. He was heavily criticised for it, 
fiercely so for the work plan with the Iranians to settle the historical 
scores of the nuclear programme. Larijani resigned when diplomacy 
with the P5+1 got stuck. Typically, whenever progress seemed possi-
ble, another Security Council resolution blocked it. Or the rivals for 
political power in Teheran denied each other a diplomatic success. Or 
some other top-level move such as a damaging piece of intelligence 
came in the way. 
 
The scope for win–win solutions was therefore miniscule. When the 
negotiators tried to find a way forward, they were quickly undermined 
and brought to order.  
Concluding remarks 
The mounting US pressure on Iran made Iranian decision-makers re-
calcitrant, pushing the nuclear programme in defiance. Efforts to bring 
the other P5+1 closer to the US position and keep them together hard-
ened the conflict and made it more focused on nuclear issues. Omi-
nously, further action boils down, more and more, to the relationship 
between three states: Iran, Israel and the USA. 
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There has been no shared vision of what to go for or what the talks 
should cover. There have been many exchanges of positions, but few 
attempts at sustained exchange of concessions. There have been no 
agreed criteria, the NPT being one key basis and Security Council res-
olutions another. International inspections have been subordinated to 
politics and become bones of contention. Iran has stalled and reverted 
to the minimum of safeguards obligations under the NPT; Western 
leaders have asked for more inspections, well aware that nobody can 
prove a negative and in the hope of finding incriminating evidence
31
. 
All the time, the domestic constraints have been tight and growing 
even tighter both in Iran and in the USA. The negotiators have been 
kept on a short leash. When the most enterprising among them sought 
to find common ground at the margin of their instructions (Solana, 
Larijani) they were quickly reined in. When ElBaradei agreed with 
Iran on a work plan to clarify the remnants of the past, he was harshly 
criticized for the initiative. Far from anything resembling integrative 
approaches to conflict resolution (Fisher and Ury 1991) or communi-
cative action (Habermas 1984), the case of Iran may belong to the es-
timated five per cent of conflicts that do not lend themselves to resolu-
tion by diplomatic means (Coleman 2011). 
              
The talks have been characterized as ‘dialogues of the deaf’ because 
they have been about little more than exchanges of positions and asso-
ciated questions of clarification. There has been no sustained process 
of give and take. When, at long last, it was agreed in principle to go 
step by step on the basis of reciprocity, the parties proved unable to do 
this in practice.  
 
The talks have also been ‘dialogues of the blind’, for lack of insight 
and understanding of ‘the other’. In 2005, the EU3/EU either failed to 
grasp the turn that Iranian politics was taking, or they were held back 
by the United States, or – more likely – a combination of both was at 
work. Power politics trumped the search for diplomatic solutions. 
Most of the time, the US, the UK and France also tended to address 
Iran top–down, like the USA. More than anything else, the name of 
the game has been power play. 
 
Criticizing his predecessor for making concessions with miniscule re-
turns, Ahmadinejad went on the offensive in relation to Israel and the 
West and raised the stakes by advancing the nuclear programme, 
which became the prime symbol and concrete expression of Iranian 
sovereignty and independence. Iranian leaders have been quick to crit-
icize each other for hints of compromise.  
                                                 
31  Hans Blix has argued that mistakes made in Iraq are being made over again in Iran. See 
Serri "Iran’s Inspectors are Repeating the Iraq Mistakes," Informed Commet 
(http://www.juancole.com/2011/11/serri-irans-un-inspectors-are-repeating-the-iraq-
mistakes.html), November 18, 2011.. 
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In the beginning, Obama appeared very different from Bush. But he, 
too, was heavily constrained by policies and sentiments that had been 
perpetuated and reinforced for thirty years. He could have done more 
to create action space for himself, but did not want Iran to become a 
matter of domestic political debate, and so became hostage to domes-
tic constraints.
32
 The US political scene is heavily influenced by Israe-
li interests, the alliance with Israel being stronger than ever. Having 
tried the diplomatic track in 2009 with a ‘single roll of the dice’33 and 
failed, Obama opted for continuity.  
 
Sometimes, actors go to the table because it is deemed the correct 
thing to do, not because they believe in a diplomatic solution. For in-
stance, if military action is entertained, talks may be important to gain 
legitimacy for it. Sometimes actors are motivated by the opposite – 
resorting to diplomacy in an effort to avoid a military outcome. That 
was the main concern of the Europeans from the beginning and for the 
other P5 when they became involved in the talks, and it was a leitmo-
tif for ElBaradei. And sometimes, actors take a long view and engage 
in confidence-building.  
 
When Turkey and Brazil picked up the ball from the failed fuel-swap 
negotiations in October 2009 they addressed many Iranian interlocu-
tors on a many different issues. In Iran there are many centres of pow-
er and the nuclear problem is among the most intractable ones, so 
there is merit in building good faith with several players on more than 
one issue. Between November 2009 and May 2010, the Turks and 
Brazilians spent more time with the Iranians than the entire P5+1 
combined (Parsi 2011). These were talks among equals, overcoming 
Iranian sensitivities about mutual respect. There was a degree of trust 
between them to begin with, so they capitalized on that, and Turkey 
and Brazil were not constrained by domestic politics. Hence the at-
traction of using such countries as intermediaries. However, big pow-
ers are loath to allow smaller states to intervene in their conflicts, and 
they did not on this occasion either.  
 
Washington has kept its powder dry, but always wanted to decide for 
itself and not be pushed into war by the Israelis. In 2012, buying time 
was an important reason for going to Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow. 
In an election year, the consequences of another big war in the Middle 
East are too unpredictable for comfort. Sanctions and cyber-attacks 
have been justified similarly, to demonstrate to the Israelis that tough 
measures have been adopted and to insist that further consideration of 
military action will have to wait till their impact becomes clear. Also, 
                                                 
32.  Obama’s initial point man on Iran, Dennis Ross, was not known for willingness to pursue 
diplomatic options that might be at odds with Israeli interests. 
33  The title of Trita Parsi’s book , a phrase that an administration official had used to de-
scribe the limited negotiation efforts pursued by the Obama presidency. 
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there has been the hope that sanctions and other means of pressure can 
lead to regime change.  
 
However, as means to back diplomacy, sanctions work only if they 
can be lifted. The most biting US sanctions cannot: they are nailed 
down in law and can only be modified by a Congress which is 
staunchly pro-Israel and anti-Iran. Cyber-attacks are not helpful either. 
When President Nixon engaged China he did the opposite, ordering 
the CIA to stop all activities in Tibet in the name of consistency. Sanc-
tions and cyber-attacks make better sense on the way to war because 
they heighten tensions, building up to the conclusion that all other 
means have been tried, so use of force is the sole remaining way to 
halt Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
Appendix 1: Select list of events for 
Iran and nuclear diplomacy 
 
Autumn 2003–2006  
- Iran’s change of policy toward transparency and the Teheran 
Declaration of October 2003, announcing Iran’s agreement to 
suspend its enrichment activities during the forthcoming nego-
tiations with the EU3 as a confidence-building measure, and its 
readiness to allow the IAEA to apply the Additional Protocol 
(AP) to the safeguards agreement on a voluntary basis. In re-
turn, the EU3 agree to recognize Iran’s ‘nuclear rights’ and to 
outline specific ways in which Iran can provide ‘objective 
guarantees’ as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.  
- Paris Agreement of October 2004, in which Iran agrees to en-
large and extend the suspension to include uranium conversion 
and centrifuge production while negotiations are underway. 
- Iranian statement of 1 August 2005 that conversion activities 
will be resumed; inauguration of Iran’s new president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on 3 August; and the EU3 offer to 
Iran a few days later. The offer is short on content and the new 
government scorns it, calling it a national humiliation.   
- Resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors of September 
2005, stating that Iran’s history of concealment and reporting 
failures constitute ‘noncompliance’. 
- February 2006 referral of the Iran file to the UNSC.   
 
2006– 2009  
- Announcement of January 2006 to begin operating a small 
R&D enrichment     cascade at the pilot plant in Natanz 
- Referral of the Iran file to the UNSC on 4 February 2006, and 
Iran’s subsequent withdrawal from the Additional Protocol. 
- The new offer by the P5+1 of June 2006, prepared on Europe-
an initiative. This offer is more generous than the offer of Au-
gust 2005. 
- UNSC resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006, adopted under Ch. 
VII, three weeks before Iran had promised to respond to the 
P5+1 offer of June, asking Iran to suspend uranium enrichment 
and resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA. 
- 21 pp. Iranian response to the P5+1 offer 
- UNSC resolution 1737 of December 2006, under Art. 41 of 
Ch. VII, the first resolution introducing sanctions against Iran. 
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- UNSC resolution 1747 of March 2007, the second sanctions 
resolution. 
- The ‘Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations’ of May 
2008, an Iranian invitation for comprehensive talks on political 
and security issues, including a proposal for international fuel-
cycle consortia around the world. 
- The EU3 presents a third proposal on 12 June 2008, largely re-
iterating previous proposals for talks across a range of areas 
and repeating the demand for suspension of fuel-cycle activi-
ties as a precondition for talks. A few days later, Iran repeats 
its proposals for talks. 
- Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili meets the P5+1 in 
Geneva in July 2008. For the first time, a US official takes part 
(Undersecretary of State William J. Burns). 
- UNSC resolution 1835 of 27 September 2008, the third sanc-
tions resolution. 
 
2009  –  
– Obama’s inaugural speech of January 2009: ‘To the Muslim 
world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest 
and mutual respect’. 
– Meeting of the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva, 1 October 2009, dis-
cussing a fuel swap whereby Iran would send 2/3 of its en-
riched uranium abroad in return for fuel rods for the Teheran 
Research Reactor. Follow-up discussions on technical aspects 
start 19 October, but fail. 
– Announcement of an agreement between Brazil, Turkey and 
Iran on a fuel swap along the same lines, but with acknowl-
edgement of Iran’s right to enrich, 17 May 2010. 
– Announcement one day later that the P5+1 have reached 
agreement on a fourth sanctions resolution, adopted on 9 June 
2010.  
– The P5+1 and Iran meet in Istanbul, January 2011: the meeting 
is inconclusive. 
–  The P5+1 and Iran resume talks in Istanbul, April 2012; talks 
are continued in Bagdad in May and in Moscow in June. The 
Istanbul meeting raises expectations of results, but in Moscow 
the talks are suspended indefinitely. The parties will stay on, 
with a view to eventual resumption of negotiations. 
 
Comparisons and conclusions 
Pernille Rieker and Ole Jacob Sending (NUPI) 
 
 
The aim of this report has been to study the role of dialogue as a tool 
to prevent, manage, and resolve international conflicts. The three cas-
es differ in terms of type of conflict, duration and outcome.  
 
In Libya, the conflict has (temporarily) been solved by virtue of the 
military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council. Prior to 
the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Western powers had negotiated over 
different and only partly related issues (WMD programme, Lockerbie, 
Bulgarian nurses) and these negotiations fit with elements of the inte-
grative approach.  
 
The case of Iran has to do with its nuclear programme, but at a deeper 
level it is a manifestation of a more fundamental conflict over the fu-
ture political landscape in the Middle East. There are few signs of 
genuine interest in finding a solution to the conflict on either side. 
Mutual mistrust reigns, and the conflict seems to fall squarely in the 
five per cent category of conflicts that are if extremely difficult to re-
solve. Changes in the domestic or regional context may generate a 
willingness to talk, but it is highly uncertain that such talk will pro-
duce more than posturing on each side. 
 
The Russian-Georgian conflict is a deep rooted territorial conflict but 
here, too, much more is at stake in that Georgia so clearly orients itself 
towards the West, causing many to dub the Russian intervention as a 
‘proxy war with the west’. Dialogue has had some significance in 
managing the Russia-Georgian conflict after the 2008 war, but the un-
derlying conflict remains the same. 
 
Dialogue is important as a diplomatic tool, but the conditions needed 
for an integrative approach to succeed are seldom present in inter-
cultural conflicts. Even though a win-win solution seems achievable in 
some specific cases, it is often limited due to a prevailing underlying 
conflict. Such agreements can provide temporary stability, but are also 
easily undone.  
 
We find elements of an integrative approach at work, but no sustained 
effect of dialogue other than as a precondition for the application of 
other policy tools. Below, we list some observations of a more generic 
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quality in the hope of stimulating discussion about how to think about 
dialogue and engagement as a tool to resolve and manage conflicts. 
 
Having specified that we look at what we term ‘crises’ – intense con-
flicts resulting in or at the verge of turning violent – we have identi-
fied the logic of dialogue and have sought to assess its impact on out-
comes. The conclusion is sobering: in no instance did dialogue itself 
result in progress defined in terms of an agreement or a reduction of 
tensions. When progress was made, it was because the interests of one 
or more of the key players had changed.  
 
Based on our findings it is difficult to hold that dialogue with those 
who hold fundamentally different values and interest can change their 
behaviour. Or rather: contact with such groups may open the way for 
the application of a host of other foreign policy tools aimed at chang-
ing their behaviour and policies, which may be effective over time. It 
can be anything from the threat or use of sanctions to the offering of 
economic incentives and political support. Staying engaged and hav-
ing contact with actors, then, may render possible the application of 
other policy tools that may be effective over time in changing actors’ 
interests and willingness to negotiate. Below, we highlight some gen-
eral observations that emerge from our comparative analysis and that 
may point towards more general lessons or insights.  
 
All cases under analysis here supports the view that dialogue can be a 
useful tool but that there is little inherent in dialogue that promote mu-
tual understanding and enduring, peaceful agreements. Dialogue may 
be deliberative and serve to change actors’ interests and behaviour, 
but this seems to presuppose trust and a shared communicative hori-
zon. The types of conflict that we analyse here are characterized pre-
cisely of a lack of such trust. Below, we highlight eight lessons that 
can serve as a point of departure for ways to possibly make engage-
ment and dialogue a more effective tool. 
 
Actors’ behaviour and positions may change as a result of changing 
international or domestic circumstances, not as a result of dialogue 
itself.  
 
In the case of Iran, there has been little willingness for dialogue and 
the few attempts we have seen, have been motivated out of an attempt 
to avoid war (or perhaps to legitimise war on a later stage) rather than 
out of a fundamental belief that negotiation would increase the under-
standing between the parties. Mistrust and internal constraints on both 
sides have put huge limits on the negotiations. The few examples of 
progress in the negotiations have not been followed up, rather on the 
contrary. In the case of Libya, we also see that both geopolitical and 
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domestic factors are at play in all of the different dialogue situations 
and that the dialogue is a facilitating mechanism, but not a mechanism 
that changes the fundamentals in the conflict or solve the underlying 
conflicts. It was of course a necessary and important tool and the dif-
ferent negotiated results were real and important, but the reason for 
the breakthroughs must primarily be found elsewhere – sometimes 
internationally, sometimes domestically. In this case the underlying 
conflict was not solved and this also explains why Libya could go so 
rapidly from being a foe to be a friend and then, in the end, to be a foe 
again. Similarly, the conflict between Russia and Georgia is of the en-
during kind in the sense that the underlying conflict is not solved. In 
this conflict we also see other factors than the dialogue itself that may 
explain the outcome. As we have seen Russia could accept the condi-
tions presented by France and the EU since it had beaten Georgia on 
the ground. Geopolitics and power politics are important here since 
this conflict also can be interpreted as a Russian-Western conflict 
 
Dialogue rarely transforms actors’ values and identity and is there-
fore seldom sufficient to solve deep rooted conflicts even though it 
may affect both the timing of events and the nature of the measures 
that are adopted. 
 
As such, dialogue is merely an opportunity to build trust so that – over 
time – pragmatic solutions may be found if there is sufficient willing-
ness to compromise. While the ‘integrative’ approach may have added 
analytical and practical value in general or perhaps in negotiations 
over specific issues, it seem to have its limits when the aim is to find a 
solution to long term and deep rooted conflicts or as an approach to 
negotiate between regimes that have a radically different normative 
basis. Such an approach requires mutual confidence and trust, and as 
we have seen, the conflicts under analysis here have parties that do not 
readily lend themselves to such an approach. The reason for that is 
that these particular conflicts are in part about the actors’ identities 
and attendant foundational values. The limited successes of dialogue 
in the Georgia-Russian conflict and that between Libya and the West 
are interesting, but even in these cases the underlying conflicts were 
not addressed. In the case of Iran, on the other hand, the underlying 
conflict seems to prevent dialogue from taking place at all. For long 
periods of time, the talks have been limited to exchange of positions. 
Both in the Libya case and the Georgia-Russian case timing also seem 
to be important and could partly explain the successes of the negotia-
tions. 
 
Lack of enforcement mechanisms in international politics makes any 
negotiated agreement fragile. As a result, agreements based on dia-
logue needs enforcements mechanisms. 
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Dialogue can result in agreements and breakthroughs, but because dia-
logue, in and of itself, does not contain enforcement mechanisms, any 
breakthrough or agreement is inherently unstable: it can easily unravel 
in the absence of an anchor or enforcement mechanism, which rarely 
exist at the international level. There are many examples of peace 
agreements and breakthroughs that have unravelled at a later stage 
precisely because a consensus/agreement at t-1 can be undone at t-2 
by a change in domestic interests or international conditions. Libya is 
clearly an example of that, but also the various failed negotiation at-
tempts between Iran and the West. Finally, the Georgian-Russian 
peace agreement of 2008 was successful, but since the underlying 
conflict is not solved there is no guarantee that it will prevail. 
 
Dialogue or talk is ‘cheap’ and may easily be used to legitimize or 
offer cover for other more aggressive strategies.  
 
The three cases show how dialogue is often used as a foil to advance 
objectives that increase rather than decrease tensions. Indeed, a central 
feature of dialogue – diplomacy – is that it is considered progressive 
and bears promise of peaceful solutions. Because of this, engaging in 
diplomatic processes often serve to legitimize strategies that are any-
thing but progressive. For instance, this is clearly the case with Iran 
where initiatives for dialogues are advanced in parallel to rather ag-
gressive statements and actions from both sides. Libya in 2011 and the 
first phase of the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 may also be re-
ferred to as examples of attempts to use dialogue to legitimize more 
aggressive approaches. 
 
The character of the dialogue seem to differ dependent on whether the 
negotiation is undertaken by experts or by more moderate parties, by 
parties that are heavily involved in the conflict or if it is facilitated by 
a neutral third party. 
 
As the three cases have shown, it is often useful to have interlocutors 
that are either pragmatic and/or have a certain distance to the conflict. 
In the Iranian case, constructive explorations of common ground were 
made when Ali Larijani, a pragmatist, and Javier Solana was negotiat-
ing. This is interesting even though it did not result in anything con-
crete and that it ended with Ahmadinejad replacing Larijani by a less 
pragmatic negotiator. In the Libyan case, more neutral parties were 
often chosen to transmit the message from the regime and the dialogue 
succeeded when the more moderate forces were representing the re-
gime. Finally the Russia-Georgian conflict clearly shows that a neutral 
third party may be of a certain importance.  
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The character of negotiations differs depending on the level of secre-
cy. 
 
In the introduction, we referred to the negative and positive sides of 
secret negotiations. While secrecy may facilitate the initiation of talks 
and prevent popular interference in the process, talks undertaken in 
public make it easier for arguments to commit over time. Even though 
the negotiations are seldom transparent, it is often known that they are 
conducted. This has been the case in the dialogue with Iran and in the 
Georgian-Russian conflict. While the Iranian conflict can refer to few 
or no results, the negotiations in the Georgian-Russian conflict suc-
ceeded even thought they were public. In some cases, however, the 
fact that the parties meet at all is also a secret. This was the case in 
most of the negotiations between Libya and the West, which was at 
least partially successful. This means that it is difficult to draw a con-
clusion on what to prefer and that this is highly dependent on the 
character of the conflict.  
 
Western states often adopt a top-down approach, making it more diffi-
cult to generate trust and establish a genuine dialogue.  
 
Armed with a sense of supremacy anchored in a combination of mate-
rial preponderance and a claim to universal values, western powers 
often demand concessions from others as a precondition for starting 
negotiations. As the Iran and Libya cases both demonstrate, the ‘impe-
rial’ or top-down attitude of western states generates tensions that un-
dermine the effectiveness of dialogue. It is, we argue, no coincidence 
that Turkey and Brazil did broker a deal with Iran while EU3 or the 
US could not. Libya, Iran and Russia, all wanted/wants to be recog-
nized as significant players in their respective region, a recognition 
that is often not accorded to them by significant others (US, EU, 
‘west’). There is a paradox here: While great powers are generally 
needed to guarantee and make parties commit to an agreement, they 
are often not the best mediators because of a tendency to try to univer-
salize their particular interests. Conversely, small and medium-sized 
powers can be good mediators, but they are often unable to make the 
parties stick to an agreement because they lack the resources to sanc-
tion them. 
 
Dialogue is more effective at preventing conflicts than resolving them  
 
We have assessed the nature and effects of dialogue in three cases and 
concluded that it is only effective as part of a larger battery of diplo-
matic tools. Nonetheless, it is quite certain that not having a dialogue 
can heighten the risk of misunderstandings and further push actors in 
the direction of positions that preclude any possibility of an agree-
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ment. Indeed, dialogue is perhaps most effective in preventing ten-
sions from becoming manifest conflicts. As all the cases show, the 
fundamentals of each conflict are based on historically received and 
politically nurtured ideas about the other. If anything, dialogue can 
help nuance and transform understandings of others and increase the 
capacity to recognize and tolerate difference. 
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